United Nations S/PV.3492 (Resumption 1)

Security Council

Fiftieth Year

Provisional

3492nd Meeting

Wednesday, 18 January 1995, 3.15 p.m.
New York

President:	Mr. Cárdenas	(Argentina)
Members:	Botswana	Mr. Legwaila
	China	Mr. Wang Xuexian
	Czech Republic	Mr. Kovanda
	France	Mr. Mérimée
	Germany	Mr. Henze
	Honduras	Mr. Martínez Blanco
	Indonesia	Mr. Wisnumurti
	Italy	Mr. Fulci
	Nigeria	Mr. Gambari
	Oman	Mr. Al-Khussaiby
	Russian Federation	Mr. Lavrov
	Rwanda	Mr. Ubalijoro
	United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland	Sir David Hannay
	United States of America	Mrs. Albright

Agenda

An Agenda for Peace

Supplement to an Agenda for Peace: position paper of the Secretary-General on the occasion of the fiftieth anniversary of the United Nations (S/1995/1)

95-85054 (E)

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The meeting resumed at 3.40 p.m.

Mr. Fulci (Italy): The tragic earthquake that has just struck Japan prompts me to open my remarks by joining you, Mr. President, and other speakers in expressing our profound solidarity with and sincere condolences to our Japanese colleague, Ambassador Owada. These are the sentiments not only of the Italian Mission here in New York but also of the Government and the people of Italy as a whole.

Let me begin by expressing Italy's agreement with the statement that will be made shortly by the Permanent Representative of France, Ambassador Mérimée, on behalf of the European Union, to which we fully subscribe. Our national comments are meant only to underline particular aspects or criteria that we deem of special importance.

The "Supplement to An Agenda for Peace", prepared by the Secretary-General on the occasion of the fiftieth anniversary of the United Nations, is a much-appreciated essay that summarizes the challenges facing the United Nations in the aftermath of the cold war, in the light of the experience of the United Nations since the Agenda for Peace was first presented by Mr. Boutros-Ghali. The Secretary-General's reading of international reality largely corresponds to the views of my authorities. Some of these views were expressed in this Chamber only last week by the Italian Foreign Minister.

The proliferation of forces claiming an autonomous role on the international scene multiplies the risks of regional conflicts. Thus, there is a greater need to get to the root of the problems and to adapt the *modus operandi* of the United Nations in this field. Furthermore, in our opinion, peace-keeping operations must not overshadow the other essential tasks established by the Charter: to promote economic development, to protect human rights and to affirm democratic principles. If, as everyone seems to agree, there can be no peace and security without development, then we need a global vision of security.

Allow me to deal with methods before discussing the Secretary-General's suggestions on preventive diplomacy, peace-keeping, regional cooperation, sanctions and disarmament.

Concerning methods, the debate over an Agenda for Peace, part II, has taken on a public dimension. For some time now the General Assembly has been discussing the complex issues it raises in the Committee of 34. In last year's Presidential Statements of 3 May, 27 July and 4 November, the Security Council focused on the problems of peace-keeping, stand-by forces and the mechanisms for consultation with troop-contributing countries. Hopefully, like the General Assembly, the Council will continue systematically to study the individual points in the Supplement in order to foster homogeneous and coherent responses to these interdependent issues.

With respect to preventive diplomacy, the crises facing the international community have changed radically and show a tendency to be less reactive to the instruments of classical diplomacy. Thus we must drastically expand the United Nations capacity for early warning, negotiating influence and crisis management. The role of the Secretary-General's Special Envoys in recent success stories, such as Cambodia and Mozambique, cannot be overemphasized.

Therefore, considering also the efforts already made to downsize the Secretariat, the proposal to expand the contingent of high-level personalities, utilizing the indications provided by Member States, seems to us quite pertinent. Rightly, the Secretary-General has remarked on the increased cost that this would entail, especially for long-term support missions. But perhaps support for Special Envoys could also be provided by their own countries, through their embassies.

Peace-keeping operations face numerous sub-problems that cannot be addressed in a single meeting. We remain convinced — as is the Secretary-General — that the United Nations must take a fundamentally different approach to operations under Chapters VI and VII of the Charter. The difference must be in resources and structures, both quantitatively and qualitatively; conditions, where the consensus of the parties is the primary condition; impartiality; the use of force, which should always be the very last resort, as our colleague from Honduras said this morning; and the mandate.

Frankly, we are growing increasingly sceptical about "dual-use operations". When peace-keeping operations are created for interposition or monitoring, or to support humanitarian action, they simply cannot be amplified later on; instead, they should be completely redesigned to fit Chapter VII of the Charter. Furthermore, the transition from one phase to another must correspond to an increased involvement of troop-contributing countries in the decision-making process. We had a very bad experience with this in Somalia, and we will never tire of repeating it again and again.

A second order of problems concerns the United Nations growing difficulty in promptly obtaining suitable forces on a case-by-case basis. We continue to believe in the formula of stand-by forces, even if we share the Secretary-General's perplexity, given the huge gap between availability in theory and availability in practice. But we do not believe that the hypothesis of a rapid reaction force contradicts the model of stand-by forces. One could even project the creation of a rapid reaction force to be deployed only after the consent of the participating nations, as the final outcome of a process that started with stand-by forces.

Those considerations are intertwined with the issues of regional organizations and their role, or of groups of States that may take autonomous initiatives to implement Council decisions. The Secretary-General stresses that this type of operation entails greater responsibility, because it is tied to the use of force — for example, the Gulf War, Somalia and Haiti.

We are convinced that there is growing recognition of the need for more regional cooperation, as demonstrated by the decisions taken at the Budapest Summit of the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) — the former Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE), the Western European Union (WEU) document of Bonn-Petersberg, the Atlantic Summit in Brussels, and the Organization of African Unity (OAU) Conference in Cairo. The availability of "dedicated" forces for rapid deployment with specific duties, including those of a humanitarian nature, has been discussed and, to certain extent, decided on by the WEU. The OSCE, for its part, has done initial planning for a peace-keeping operation in Nagorny Karabakh.

On another subject, we believe it is important to reflect seriously on the sanctions system. In discussing the extension of the implementation of resolution 943 (1994) a few days ago, the Italian Foreign Minister said:

> "Let us not forget that sanctions hurt people more than they do Governments. By creating the perception of an international conspiracy against the country, sanctions often tend to rally the people around the Government rather than mobilize them against it" (*S/PV.3487, p. 13*)

as sanctions are often meant to do.

Not everyone may agree with the proposals formulated by the Secretary-General for new procedures in the Council's monitoring and assessment of the impact of sanctions. Yet there can be no doubt that in deciding on sanctions the Council must be very selective. Sanctions are an instrument that must be used parsimoniously, and only when there are irrefutable reasons.

The Secretary-General also recalled the commitment expressed at the 1992 Summit meeting to strengthen United Nations capacity in the fields of disarmament, arms control and non-proliferation. We all share the view that 1995 is an important year in this effort.

De-mining is a key issue in countries that have severe development problems and are dealing with the aftermath of conflicts. This is the direction taken in initiatives of the European Union as well as in the Secretary-General's establishment of a trust fund. Equally noteworthy is the recent creation of a data bank on de-mining at the Department of Humanitarian Affairs. Having already implemented a self-imposed moratorium on land-mines, Italy intends to continue to do its part, and urges further steps towards a true system of international control.

Mr. Gambari (Nigeria): On behalf of the Nigerian Government and people, I wish to convey condolences to the Government and people of Japan for the enormous losses they have suffered as a result of the recent earthquake in that country.

It is appropriate that the Security Council should devote a special session to an open debate on the "Supplement to an Agenda for Peace: position paper of the Secretary-General on the occasion of the fiftieth anniversary of the United Nations", and my delegation is grateful to the Secretary-General for this important document. Nigeria fully supports the views expressed by Indonesia on behalf of the Non-Aligned Movement (NAM). However, as a country that is a major troop contributor to both regional and United Nations peace-keeping operations, we would like to make the following additional comments.

The end of the cold war has not, unfortunately, brought about the safer and more peaceful world which was generally hoped for. In his "An Agenda for Peace", released about two and a half years ago, the Secretary-General drew Member States' attention to certain hard decisions which had to be taken to meet the challenges of the post-cold-war era in the areas of preventive diplomacy, peacemaking and peace-keeping. Quite rightly, the Secretary-General, on his own initiative, also

touched on the related concepts of post-conflict peace-building and peace enforcement.

The document now before us takes stock of the performance of the United Nations in the complex and challenging fields of conflict management and conflict resolution against the background of extant difficulties, and it suggests options for overcoming some of the contradictions immanent in those instruments available to the international community for the maintenance of international peace and security. One cannot but sympathize with the Organization's managers, who, within the short span of two years, have had to cope with a phenomenal increase in the number and volume of crises, as highlighted in the Secretary-General's Supplement. Furthermore, these crises have, in a broader sense, been predominantly intra-State rather that inter-State, sometimes with no clear-cut battle lines and almost always with devastating consequences for non-combatants — in particular, women and children. Clearly, this underlines the dire need for rethinking many aspects of how to cope with such crises and conflicts. It calls for new tools, new concepts and new responses, as well as a greater political commitment and increased resources from Member States of our Organization.

With respect to preventive diplomacy and peace-making, there can be no denying the continued relevance of early warning mechanisms and other preventive means for nipping in the bud or defusing situations of tension before they develop into full-blown conflicts. My Government believes that in order to achieve the desired results of early preventive measures the Secretariat should cast its net far and wide in recruiting personnel with the requisite experience and knowledge of local situations to undertake conflict-prevention missions on behalf of the Secretary-General. Nigeria is ready to make available to the Secretary-General individuals with the necessary skills, background and relevant experience.

My delegation welcomes the flexible manner in which the United Nations has responded so far to the evolving process and challenges of peace-keeping. The lessons learned as a result of this flexible approach need to be further developed. Meanwhile, we can all be justifiably proud of the high degree of professionalism, skill and dedication of our "Blue Helmets" involved in the complex and challenging tasks in the field and on the ground. We salute the entire Secretariat, especially the Department of Peace-keeping Operations and the Department of Humanitarian Affairs, for the creativity and dynamism with which they have adapted to the changed and changing circumstances of peace-keeping and conflict management.

However, certain aspects of peace-keeping deserve serious reconsideration. Here I would like to pose a few questions. For example, how do we ensure that mandate periods given to peace-keeping operations are realistically determined, taking into account the complexity of the particular situation, while refraining from using them as instruments to coerce parties in conflict in order to achieve short-term rather than long-term objectives in finding durable solutions to the conflicts in the various areas of the world? Secondly, how can United Nations operations be sustained in the face of unexpected but unavoidable setbacks which tend to erode and undermine the credibility and authority of the United Nations by making the United Nations look as if it wanted to cut and run in conflict situations? I believe it is inappropriate for a peace-making Organization such as ours to cut and run whenever unforeseen difficulties arise in peace-keeping operations. Thirdly, how does the United Nations standardize the procedures and criteria for establishing and terminating peace-keeping operations in order to avoid the perception — or is it the reality? — of double standards?

Nigeria is acutely aware of the difficulties posed to peace-keeping operations by the shortage of troops and equipment. It is important, therefore, that continuing efforts be made by the Secretary-General in respect of stand-by arrangements and that Member States provide the necessary support to translate the proposal into reality — in particular, the support of those who are in a position to provide such badly needed logistic, equipment and training facilities to the proposed force.

The objective, in our opinion, is how to reduce the time-lag between the time the Security Council decides to authorize a peace-keeping operation and the actual full deployment of such an operation on the ground. We would prefer this approach to the idea of a rapid reaction force proposed by the Secretary-General, because we strongly believe that such a rapid reaction force presents many problems.

My delegation ascribes due importance to the Secretary-General's prescription on post-conflict peace-building — an issue which in our view remains pivotal to the establishment of a durable and comprehensive peace in societies that have just undergone crises in which the United Nations has been involved. The scope of assistance which the United Nations could provide

includes the retraining of militia organizations, institutional reforms and the execution of development projects. In this respect, my Government shares the Secretary-General's justifiable concern at the reluctance which Member States have often shown with regard to rendering assistance which is necessary in order to secure the peace that has been gained through peace-keeping operations. There are several examples from our continent, Africa, to illustrate this unfortunate trend. We cannot but hope that Member States will become more forthcoming in supporting peace-building activities, even when such exercises involve additional costs, cognizant of the fact that these efforts may be the best way of assuring that the major efforts already invested in helping to end conflicts are not undermined in the post-conflict period.

The Secretary-General puts his finger right on the contradictions that arise from the employment of sanctions in efforts to maintain or restore international peace and security. Therefore, several questions again need to be addressed. First, how do we, for example, ensure that it is properly targeted to affect the relevant segment of a country's population — that is, usually, the leadership or the senior members of a Government? Secondly, how do we make adequate provisions to protect innocent civilians? Finally, how do we compensate the neighbouring States that often bear the brunt of enforcement, at great expense to their own economies and to their own domestic stability?

My delegation does not underestimate the fact that in certain circumstances, short of the use of military force, sanctions remain one of the most potent instruments available to the international community for achieving compliance from parties unamenable to peaceful negotiations. Indeed, experience has shown that, given the political commitment of all Members to enforce the measures, sanctions could indeed within a short time frame have the desired effects. However, we must not forget that prolonged imposition of sanctions could have the opposite effect of producing greater intransigence and defiance from the people and Government, who may suddenly find common ground by pleading that sanctions are an international conspiracy by the international community to unduly punish them.

An unhealthy development in the area of sanctions is the unilateral imposition of measures by some countries on other States in an attempt to influence the domestic politics of the targeted country. Such unilateral actions give sanctions a very negative connotation and may very well undermine their moral force.

Enforcement action - another issue raised by the Secretary-General - could be part of peacemaking and peace-keeping. It is the view of my delegation that there may not be a dividing line between peacemaking and peace enforcement. We are of course aware that in the present circumstances the United Nations lacks the necessary political backing and resource support from Member States to undertake directly enforcement as envisaged under Chapter VII of the Charter.

The past few examples of the collective use of enforcement action have been undertaken by a group of Member States with the blessing of the United Nations. My delegation believes that this may not always be the ideal situation, and present difficulties being faced by the Organization should not be an excuse to contract out to a group of powerful States what would normally be a United Nations responsibility. With the necessary political will and commitment to the ideals of collective security enshrined in the Charter, it is the view of my delegation that multinational forces for peace enforcement could be placed at the disposal of the United Nations and might well operate under the command of the Secretary-General and his staff. This is one of the hard decisions that needs to be taken by Member States.

Effective coordination between the United Nations and other players in conflict situations has been rightly identified by the Secretary-General as crucial to the successful and effective management and resolution of conflicts. It remains critically important that all other agencies, especially Governments, which authorize and finance United Nations activities, continue to lend their full support to the Secretary-General in the discharge of his onerous duties. Especially crucial is the role of regional organizations and the inter-governmental and non-governmental organizations, whose functions must be seen as complementary to the work of the United Nations itself. We share the view of the Secretary-General that the authority and supremacy of the United Nations are vital in these relationships if interregional or institutional rivalries are not to mar the prospects of achieving collective goals and objectives. No less important for the regional organizations, especially for those of developing countries, is adequate assistance from the United Nations through logistic and financial support to enable such regional organizations to execute their mandate in the maintenance of regional peace and security, a mandate which, after all, they exercise for and on behalf of the United Nations. The relationship between the United Nations and regional organizations in the area of peace-keeping is, in the view of my delegation, one of

the most underdeveloped aspects of the Agenda for Peace, which has been under consideration by the international community since 1991.

The conclusions reached by the Secretary-General in his position paper are imaginative and far-reaching, and on the whole very constructive. They underscore in our view a basic need for the United Nations to be responsive to the demands of a changing international political landscape whose form and content are yet to be fully assessed and fully determined so that the continuing legitimacy of the United Nations can be assured.

In this regard, the Secretary-General's "An Agenda for Peace", the "Supplement to An Agenda for Peace" and "An Agenda for Development", should, taken together, form a composite whole from which the United Nations can realistically meet the aspirations of the international community in the collective search for peace, in the collective search for development and the collective pursuit of the well-being of all of our peoples.

Mr. Al-Khussaiby (Oman): May I, on behalf of the Sultanate of Oman, join you, Mr. President, in extending heartfelt condolences to the people and Government of Japan and to the bereaved families of those who died as a result of the severe earthquake.

I should like to begin my statement by conveying my delegation's sincere thanks and appreciation to the Secretary-General, Mr. Boutros Boutros-Ghali, for his lucid report on the work of this Organization, entitled "Supplement to An Agenda for Peace: Position Paper of the Secretary-General on the Occasion of the Fiftieth Anniversary of the United Nations".

My delegation associates itself in particular with the position of the Non-Aligned Movement on the Secretary-General's Supplement, as reflected in the statement delivered this morning by the Permanent Representative of Indonesia to the United Nations on behalf of the countries of that Movement.

The issues addressed in the Secretary-General's report are of crucial significance, prompting all of us to take effective and collective measures to achieve positive developments in line with the fundamental purposes and principles of the Charter on which the creation of this Organization was based.

In recent years the role of the United Nations in the field of the maintenance of international peace and security has been augmented and has evolved by diverse means and as a result of complex situations that have brought to the fore both its potentials and its shortcomings. None the less, the achievements of the United Nations in this field are commendable. In the light of the experience gained in this regard, my delegation is of the opinion that it is high time for the United Nations to undertake a careful review and to approve some clear guidelines for the adoption of urgent and serious approaches that will eventually lead to the establishment of permanent mechanisms to deal with this matter. Therefore, my delegation welcomes the Security Council's timely discussion of this report.

While concurring with the statement of the Ambassador of Indonesia, my delegation would like to highlight additional points that could be taken into consideration with regard to the question of enhancing the United Nations peace-keeping operations and, more so, the means of doing so.

The United Nations can be proud of the achievements of its peace-keeping operations, of which there were 17 at the end of 1994, and of the successes of most of them. Inevitably, in the last few years, we have witnessed the emergence of other, new multidimensional peace-keeping operations. In this context, my delegation would like to recall the three principles highlighted by the Secretary-General in paragraph 33 of his report: the consent of the parties, impartiality and the non-use of force except in self-defence and under clearly defined mandates.

We should like to emphasize that it is up to the conflicting parties themselves to assume the responsibility of resolving their conflicts and that the peace-keeping forces should play a complementary role. If it becomes necessary to establish peace-keeping forces, it is obviously better for the United Nations to work closely with the regional organizations or regional groups and the concerned parties, in proportion to the readiness of the latter to cooperate with the mandate of these troops, than to work unilaterally and without the categorical consent of the conflicting parties and even the participation of the regional group.

The regional arrangements world-wide do not in any way undermine the role of the Security Council as the principal body responsible for the maintenance of international peace and security; rather, these arrangements must assist in alleviating the Council's workload and in instilling the spirit of sharing and caring

in international affairs. Lessons must be learned from the mistakes of the past so that these lessons may be prevented from recurring.

My delegation would like to reiterate what the Ambassador of Indonesia said with respect to the maintenance of the assessments of Member States agreed upon in accordance with General Assembly resolution 3101 (XXVIII). My delegation also recognizes the necessity for a broad-based discussion by the General Assembly on the report's proposals concerning the fulfilment of the additional financial obligations.

My delegation strongly believes that today's open debate is most opportune and timely. Once again, we are very grateful to the Secretary-General for the Supplement to An Agenda for Peace — his position paper on the historic occasion of the fiftieth anniversary of the United Nations. This is a very thought-provoking document. We hope that our deliberations today and the informal consultations of the members of the Council will lead to realization of the need for a proper study of objectives and appropriate actions in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations.

Finally, we hereby recognize and commend the international community's earnest and prompt contributions in respect of the many difficult issues — whether preventive diplomacy, peace-keeping, post-conflict peace-building, sanctions or disarmament.

Mr. Kovanda (Czech Republic): Some three months ago, Mr. Josef Zieleniec, my Foreign Minister, highlighted in his statement to the General Assembly some success factors of those peace-keeping operations that have worked, and he contrasted them with some of the struggling ones. He said:

> "We must ... draw the necessary lessons." *(Official Records of the General Assembly, Forty-ninth Session, Plenary Meetings, 15th meeting, p. 15)*

This is exactly what the Secretary-General and his collaborators have done by summarizing and assessing the experiences that have transpired in our efforts to maintain international peace and security over the past few years.

Why such a synthesis was called for is clear from the Secretary-General's statistics on the upsurge of these activities since 1988 — a period during which the number of peace-keeping operations has increased from 5 to 17. These statistics imply that during this period the number of military personnel deployed in the average peace-keeping operation has just about doubled, and the annual cost of the average peace-keeping operation has increased by a factor of almost five. It would seem that the average peace-keeping operation is much more resource-intensive today than six or seven years ago.

The question is, of course, whether "average peace-keeping operation" is a useful concept. Are the foregoing inferences, while they are correct, relevant? Some insights might be garnered from disaggregating extant peace-keeping operations by size.

Today, the United Nations Protection Force (UNPROFOR) is in a class by itself. Disregarding the rapidly diminishing United Nations Operation in Somalia (UNOSOM II), UNPROFOR, with its almost 40,000 people, is by an entire order of magnitude larger than the next group of operations. This next group includes the United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon and the United Nations Assistance Mission for Rwanda, and until recently it included United Nations Operation in Mozambique — each with some 5,000 people. The United Nations Peace-keeping Force in Cyprus, the United Nations Disengagement Observer Force and the United Nations Iraq-Kuwait Observer Mission have about 1,000 people each, and the remaining nine operations each feature a few dozen to a few hundred people.

Now, when we exclude UNPROFOR and UNOSOM II from the total sample the analysis of the changing size of peace-keeping operations looks quite different. Outside these two operations, we are fielding only some 20,000 people in peace-keeping operations, and the average size of each has actually decreased — from around 2,000 personnel in 1988 to fewer than 1,400 today.

The Secretary-General disaggregates peace-keeping operations qualitatively, as he analyses the changes in the nature of conflicts that they deal with. One important change is the shift from purely international conflicts, which were the predominant concern of the Security Council in earlier years, to conflicts that either are domestic ones outright or follow on the heels of the disintegration of a larger State.

This type of conflict entails different characteristics. Adversaries do not include only well-defined armies facing each other along a well-defined line. Rather, ill-defined and uncoordinated armed groups often operate throughout the territory, not only fighting their armed

adversaries but also preying on or outright attacking civilian populations.

This situation calls for a different, far more complex, response of peace-keepers, and, by implication, a different mandate. The Secretary-General makes the very interesting distinction between classical peace-keeping operations and multifunctional ones. In multifunctional operations, peace-keepers have much more to do: in addition to their traditional task of monitoring buffer zones and cease-fires, they provide humanitarian relief, protect humanitarian operations of other agencies and non-governmental organizations and, even more important perhaps, their political role is heightened: they nurture in myriad ways the implementation in the field of a settlement reached at a conference table. The list of specific tasks — and the report does contain one — is indeed long.

Two big examples of multifunctional operations are provided: Bosnia and Herzegovina, and Somalia. We note that the success of the first of these operations has been rather limited — limited so far largely to preventing the expansion and dousing the intensity of the fighting — while the second operation has been, in political terms at least, largely unsuccessful. This lack of success may well have been caused by burdening the mandates of these operations with tasks that implicitly require the use of force, mandates that were thus based on the logic of peace-enforcement rather than of peace-keeping. The Secretary-General suggests that such tasks included protecting humanitarian operations during continued warfare, protecting civilian populations in safe areas, and pressing for reconciliation rather faster than the parties could handle.

Those are very serious points, and since it is the Security Council that draws up the mandates of peace-keeping operations, albeit on the recommendation of the Secretariat, they deserve our serious reflection. For it is probably not a coincidence that precisely the two largest peace-keeping operations, which together skew the overall statistics, are, on the one hand, the most typical multifunctional ones and, on the other, among the less successful ones. In studying the lessons they offer we will be touching on the limits of the possible in peace-keeping operations. One immediate lesson is that simply continuing to increase the size of a peace-keeping operation leads to diminishing returns. What I mean is that even the largest peace-keeping operation cannot enforce peace, whilst enforcement may be a task beyond our capacities altogether. It may indeed be that when enforcement is needed we well-nigh have to look to the mechanism of farming out the task, such as to groups of States, as outlined in the sub-chapter on enforcement action.

Nevertheless, of the several instruments at our disposal for safeguarding peace and security, peace-keeping is still one of the principal ones, the one employed most often and the one with which we have the greatest experience.

And to what ends? Once we treat UNPROFOR and UNOSOM as special cases, we end up with a mixed bag of results. We have the "classics," the United Nations Truce Supervision Organization (UNTSO), the United Nations Military Observer Group in India and Pakistan (UNMOGIP), the United Nations Peace-keeping Force in Cyprus (UNFICYP), the United Nations Disengagement Observer Force (UNDOF) and the United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon (UNIFIL), in place for 15, 20, 30, even 45 years or more, in situations where the United Nations has well-nigh run out of steam, ideas, often even initiative, and where any further change is most likely going to depend on events beyond the control of this Organization. We are in a holding pattern. The Secretary-General might as well remind us that international problems cannot be solved quickly or within a limited time. We should not lose sight of the fact that a peace-keeping operation is not an end in itself but rather a means toward the political settlement of a conflict. And if the settlement is nowhere on the horizon, does the time never come when we pack up and go?

Of the more recent operations, some are clearly successful, and the United Nations Operation in Mozambique (ONUMOZ) is an outstanding example of these — and let me stress that it was also a multifunctional operation par excellence; others are grinding away towards a resolution more or less fuzzily outlined on the horizon. Reflecting upon them indicates very clearly one important point: they are all different, every one of them is sui generis. None of these peace-keeping operations is even four years old, and fully half of them are less than two years old. But even within this group, being able to chalk up accomplishments in El Salvador, Namibia and Cambodia, in addition to Mozambique, is in and of itself a source of encouragement and pride.

Allow me merely to touch on some of the different instruments for strengthening peace and security mentioned in the report.

We agree with the Secretary-General — and, indeed, who would not? — that preventive diplomacy is preferable to resolving a conflict that has turned violent. The domestic nature of most conflicts is of course a difficulty here. We share the opinion that States should be automatically willing to accept the good offices of the United Nations, however far we may still be from this doctrine. Resorting to Article 2, paragraph 7 of the Charter is one way of legally buttressing these United Nations efforts. We would, however, hope that flagrant violations of human rights might in and of themselves constitute a good enough reason for the United Nations to step in. We draw attention to the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE), which has agreed that the principle of non-interference does not apply to situations affecting human rights protection.

For preventive diplomacy one needs, so to speak, "preventive diplomats," of which there is a dearth. It is perhaps of interest that the OSCE is developing a database of qualified, capable personalities. This is an idea the United Nations might wish to adopt, and it might perhaps even cooperate with the OSCE in utilizing its resources.

A number of important issues are discussed in the sub-chapter on peace-keeping. We are often frustrated by the lack of information, even as we do acknowledge the value of information the Secretariat provides us at just about every informal consultation of the Council. Still, we will continue to be bewildered every time we hear from other sources, for example from the press, of developments which clearly affect the situation on the ground, and which the Secretariat is not in a position to confirm or deny. The need for full substantiation of statements is clear; nevertheless, one wonders whether the omission, albeit unwitting, of important facts, does not sometimes have the same effect as the commission of informational blunders.

Unity of command is a principle we wholeheartedly support. Everyone else does too. So where is the problem? We would appreciate an evaluation of why the principle has been breached in some instances. Was it a manifestation of a Government's fickleness? Was it a result of excessive sensitivity to domestic public opinion — and who but the local politician can be the arbiter of that? Or was it perhaps a manifestation of lack of trust in the existing command? And, if so, are we doing all we can to appoint only the highest-calibre, universally respected soldiers to commanding posts?

We have taken note of the Secretary-General's disapproving remarks in this sub-chapter concerning the Security Council's alleged increased propensity for micro-management. Other critical remarks addressed to the Council occur elsewhere in the document, and we reserve the right to discuss these important issues on some other occasion.

The sub-chapter on disarmament contains very important points on what the Secretary-General has privately described as "macro-disarmament": dealing with weapons of mass destruction. My Government is very keen on being a part of these efforts, but we feel other opportunities might be even more suitable for their in-depth discussion. For the record, though, let me stress the importance we attach to the forthcoming conference of the parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT), and to the early entering into force of the chemical weapons Convention.

As for micro-disarmament, my country supports efforts to limit the arms trade. The position and policies of my country since 1990 are well known. Suffice it to say that micro-disarmament as an issue cannot be separated from the world arms trade, with all the complexities that that entails. We contribute information to the United Nations Register of Conventional Weapons, and we also support efforts to reduce civilian casualties from land-mines and have taken important national steps to this end.

As for sanctions, setting clear-cut criteria for imposing and lifting them would perhaps be desirable. We see a difference here between the political role of setting such criteria in every individual case and the technical role of determining whether the criteria have been met. We really ought to avoid giving the impression that the Security Council is, so to speak, moving the goal posts while the game is on, even if developments in the target country do not follow our original expectations.

Sanctions are indeed a double-edged sword. Let us clearly state that well-targeted sanctions do have an important role to play. On the other hand, though, we know that they often stimulate the mobilization of domestic resources; in the short run, at least, they often strengthen rather than weaken the intended political target; they may inspire the population's mistrust in the international community. Gaps in a sanctions regime have a multiplier detrimental effect on their overall effectiveness and can exacerbate their counterproductive aspects, giving rise to ingenious ways of further obviating their intended role.

The effect of sanctions on third countries is the unfairest side effect. No argument can be found for justifying the suffering of a third country that arises strictly from the accident of its geographical proximity. Quite frankly, though, we know of no simple solution and are grateful to the Secretary-General for his efforts, though they have so far been fruitless, in exploring some novel avenues.

Despite certain doubts we all have about the effectiveness of sanctions and their impact on vulnerable segments of the civilian population, they are nevertheless one of the very few instruments we have at our disposal. We do, however, by and large support the Secretary-General's recommendations contained in paragraph 75 of his report.

In a separate chapter, the Secretary-General discusses cooperation with regional organizations. Two of the forms such cooperation can take is co-deployment and joint operations. My delegation is particularly taken by the four principles he stresses for such cooperation, namely, establishing an agreed mechanism for consultations; respecting the primacy of the United Nations; clearly defining the division of tasks; and maintaining consistency, for instance of standards for peace-keeping operations.

Elsewhere in the document, the Secretary-General discusses in a fresh way enforcement action by groups of States. Recalling the war in Korea usefully reminds us that this concept was not invented recently, even though it is only recently that it has been employed with any frequency. What we would recommend is some reflection as to whether the same or similar principles that apply to peace-keeping cooperation between the United Nations and regional organizations should not also explicitly apply between the United Nations and the ad hoc groups of States entrusted with enforcement.

In this regard, we would like to see an additional principle emphasized — the principle of transparency. Two elements should be considered here. First, there is a need for regular information to be provided by United Nations sources on the performance of the regional organization or of the group of States, information that would pay particular attention to the enforcer's impartiality. The second element is the need for up-to-date information provided by the regional organization or group of States itself to the Security Council. These principles are, by and large, being observed today, but we would like to see them become a truly integral and routine part of our decision-making.

In conclusion, let me thank the Secretary-General and his team for the extraordinary document they have presented. My not touching on every one of its aspect suggests how rich it is, rather than a lack of interest on our part. The Security Council, dealing as it does day in and day out with the world's fires, seldom has the time or opportunity to sit back and contemplate the broader picture. The urgent usually pushes the important off our agenda. The document we are discussing today provides us precisely with the important, with the broader picture, and we will draw on it for a long time to come, I am sure.

Let me at this point also pay homage to the thousands of men and women whose dedicated work has allowed the Secretary-General to observe that

> "More progress has been made in the past few years towards using the United Nations as it was designed to be used than many could ever have predicted" (*S/1995/1, para. 105*).

and especially to salute those who in this effort have laid down their lives.

Mr. Ubalijoro (Rwanda): My delegation would like to pay a tribute to the Secretary-General for his useful, stimulating and encouraging "Supplement to An Agenda for Peace". We should also like to express our solidarity with and convey our condolences to the people of Japan for the suffering they are enduring as a result of the disaster created by the earthquake in their country.

After the end of the cold war, many African countries had hoped that the new era of political détente would open new horizons for them. As the new geopolitical order was forming, we realized that we had fallen into another vain illusion. It is fitting to note that some countries have even been victimized by this new political scenario.

After the genocide it experienced, our country is facing a challenge unprecedented in its history. We fully concur with and support the Secretary-General's idea on the concept of peace-building, because it is very relevant to our status quo. Currently, we are facing huge problems regarding reconstruction, rehabilitation and socio-economic development. Our greatest preoccupation is the reconciliation of the Rwandese people. The international community should realize that if it is to promote peace, stability and prosperity in developing countries, its efforts should be aimed at strengthening and

reinforcing the pillars of such factors as unity, justice and social well being in developing countries. Our Government is more than determined to take the reins of its destiny and lead its people to the brightest, most peaceful and prosperous future that its current limited economic, infrastructural and organizational capacities can provide.

Our country wishes to convey its appreciation to all the troop-contributing countries, especially those that are presently based on our territory. Given that our country is a beneficiary of such aid, we believe that it would be constructive to make a fundamental suggestion to all troop-contributing countries. We should like to express our concern at the lack of dialogue between troop-contributing countries and parties that are concerned with peace-keeping activities. As the Secretary-General points out, it is more than necessary to overcome the reluctance of countries that are a part of a conflict in which the United Nations desires to intervene. Therefore, dialogue should be encouraged between all parties concerned, either directly or indirectly, in order to harmonize the activities of peace-keeping.

Our delegation feels that, after the traumatizing genocide experience in our country, the United Nations should treasure one of the most important and valuable lessons it has learned in its 50 years of activity. We are sorry to have to continuously reiterate our allegations as we recall for the umpteenth time the Security Council's resolution of April last year to decrease the United Nations troops at the most crucial, dramatic, needy, indeed helpless, moment in our country's history. It is pitiful to have to note this contradiction: that one month later the same Security Council that had decided to pull out the United Nations peace-keeping troops reviewed its position by proposing to redeploy its troops in Rwanda. Unfortunately, the time-table was no longer on the side of the United Nations. The United Nations was not able to intervene in a rapid, correct and efficient manner as thousands of human lives were being extinguished.

In conclusion, we would like to recall the Secretary-General's view on the subject of "micro-disarmament". Even though our country adheres to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, our concerns and preoccupations on this issue are oriented in a different manner. We are appalled by the volume of trade in light weapons, which are a major threat to the security of most developing African countries. We do not wish to speak rhetorically on this matter, but our assessment — made with extreme caution and realism — is that we judge such weapons can create a disaster that can compare to the dangerous effects of a nuclear explosion. In our country, such weapons have created genocide, causing more than a million deaths in only three months — a world record for the intensity of massacres.

The President *(interpretation from Spanish):* I shall now make a statement in my capacity as representative of the Argentine Republic.

My delegation thanks the Secretary-General for preparing and submitting the position paper in document S/1995/1, entitled "Supplement to An Agenda for Peace".

This document is as opportune as it is well thought out. It is as stimulating as it is thought-provoking. It is just the kind of document that we need during this transitional period, when it is wise for us to stop — despite the urgency — and think about results and experiences, and thereby affirm or correct our course.

As is clear from today's meeting, the Security Council is beginning a task of discussion and analysis which will take some time, following the procedures of the Council in this respect, and which we hope will result in the necessary definitions and adjustments.

Nevertheless, my delegation attributes special importance to this meeting, because we believe that the opportunity to hear the opinion of Member States, especially those that are now members of the Security Council, is an exercise that will be of benefit to all.

On this occasion we should like to express our preliminary views on some of the many questions referred to by the Secretary-General. We do not intend to make an exhaustive analysis or to deal with all the subjects referred to in the report. Throughout this exercise that is beginning today we shall have ample time and opportunity to do that. We should, however, like to refer to some questions that we feel lend themselves particularly to some comments now.

It is true that, as the Secretary-General says, we are in a time of transition. This is aptly described in chapter II of his report, relating to the quantitative and qualitative changes that have taken place since the end of the cold war. But we would point that there is a difference between a disorderly transition and a the well-thought-out transition that is advocated. It is the same kind of difference that there is between lightning and a lamp: both shed light, but the former is ephemeral, dangerous and not very trustworthy, whereas the latter is constant,

safe, and definitely predictable. That is why the message sent us by the Secretary-General is so opportune. That is also why there is a need for this debate that is now beginning, on his initiative.

It is also quite true that we must adopt decisions — some of them perhaps difficult; but that is usually the way it is. Otherwise, there might be some doubt about the maturity of the commitment of Member States to the Organization. We shall revert to this matter later.

We are concerned at the Secretary-General's reference, in regard to the new types of intra-State conflicts with which our Organization has to deal, as firmly as is required, to the fact that

> "Civilians are the main victims and often the main targets". *(S/1995/1, para. 12)*

This is a clarion call. It cannot be ignored, because what is involved is the direct defence of the human being and his dignity. The international community cannot remain indifferent to the magnitude of the problem set out by the Secretary-General, which is at the very centre of humanitarian law. But we have the sad feeling that, despite that categorical and accurate affirmation, we have strayed from the path to civilization. We must immediately undertake the effort to redress this situation.

We are particularly pleased with chapter III of the Secretary-General's paper, on the instruments for the promotion of peace and security.

With regard to preventive diplomacy, we would point to the efforts and progress during the past few years.

The restructuring of the Department of Political Affairs has been quite wise. It is now possible to follow up more closely and thoroughly the tensions that could lead to regional or international crises. It is always wiser to prevent or stop conflicts before they break out. But, generally speaking, this is also the best way to make use of the meagre resources available.

Sometimes, regrettably, egotism, distrust or petty or transitory interests make people reluctant today to request or accept the helpful collaboration of our Organization. Nevertheless, without the assent of the contending parties, there is very little, strictly speaking, that the United Nations can do to prevent conflicts. That is why we would encourage the Secretary-General to persevere on the path initiated by this chapter, despite the difficulties or obstacles he may face.

In this connection, we would like to refer to the financial solutions that have been proposed, in particular those for small field missions — small in size but with a usefulness that would be far from small.

As a preliminary view, we are inclined to choose the option of using for preventive diplomacy existing credits for unforeseen and extraordinary activities. We believe that at a later stage it might be appropriate to have a specific heading in the budget for activities related to preventive diplomacy. But, of course, we do not want in that way to reduce funds that are allocated today to social activities or activities related to the promotion of development.

With regard to the maintenance of peace, the categorical restatement of the traditional philosophy in the matter is of transcendental importance. The logic of peace has a price. It is clear today that to forget or overlook this not only places us on the wrong path, but is also dangerous.

Consent of the parties, impartiality, non-use of force: these are the three central pillars of this traditional philosophy. But if there is not strict and sacred adherence to them, we shall lose from sight the minimum flexibility that is indispensable to saving or protecting lives, particularly of civilians or of those who generously expose themselves to danger so that our Organization can accomplish its mission or so that humanitarian assistance can be given to those who are suffering the consequences of war. We must express all our appreciation and gratitude for the work that has been done and the efforts that have been exerted.

We agree that during these critical times we cannot, generally speaking, impose peace-keeping operations. These are technical alternatives, measures of last resort, after all other efforts have failed.

We believe that the mechanism for consultation between the Security Council and the Secretariat is flexible. But improvements can always be made. In particular, horizontal sharing of information with all delegations, in time, is indispensable, in respect of political decision-making by the Security Council.

Here I should like to point out that the Security Council is not discharging all its responsibilities in the

decisions to start or conclude peace-keeping operations. We must not fall into the habit of becoming involved in details. We must be properly and constantly informed about the development of peace-keeping operations, specifically those that, because of their scope and complexity, are mutifaceted or require the participation of large contingents of personnel, exposed to changing circumstances and, frequently, danger.

The Charter of the United Nations, in Article 41, confers primary responsibility — I repeat: primary responsibility — on the Security Council for the maintenance of international peace and security. It makes it clear that the action expected from this body must be rapid and effective. This is stated expressly. The very nature of the Council's delicate mission requires this, but there can be no rapidity or effectiveness if there is no coordination. That is why the constant, ongoing flow of information is, I repeat, indispensable for the collegial efforts of the Security Council.

We would also emphasize the systematic implementation of consultations between the Security Council, the troop-contributing countries and the Secretariat - which, indeed, is already part of the routine of our Organization.

Governments of countries that, with the nobility that this requires, are contributing troops to the United Nations, have the right and the responsibility to be heard and to be informed, on a regular basis, of the military and political developments relating to the operation in which they are taking part. They must be able at all times to report to their people on the progress of their respective operations.

Unity in the chain of command is undoubtedly another fundamental principle in ensuring the success of these peace-keeping undertakings. The importance of this question increases in direct proportion to the dangers or the risks posed by the tasks being undertaken.

As regards reserve or stand-by forces, the Argentine Republic was one of the first countries to receive the Secretary-General's Mission charged with dealing with this question, and we were also one of the first 35 Member States explicitly to commit resources and units to this end.

As to the proposal to create a rapid reaction force, which would be a kind of strategic reserve for the Security Council, we believe that this is an interesting initiative and one that deserves careful study in all its aspects, without ruling out components of a policing nature that could be incorporated into it.

Let us now turn to the chapter on post-conflict peace-building. It must be understood that after every conflict there are socio-economic and humanitarian questions that must be tackled or resolved if there is to be a lasting peace. The medium- and long- term consolidation of ongoing military efforts will depend on successful reconstruction or rehabilitation. We must be able to count on having the necessary resources and be sure that maximum use can be made of them. One example is the central role played by the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) in the Haitian crisis, when, on President Aristide's return, it was able to resume its activities in that country. It is now in charge of the coordination and promotion of all multilateral technical assistance and of most bilateral assistance in this new stage of the restoration of democracy.

Depending on circumstances, this could involve assigning technical, economic and financial assistance tasks at various levels: development of the institutions indispensable to the functioning of democracy; respect for human rights; and tasks related to health, education, the environment and justice, when related to peace-building.

In this connection, at the initiative of our country, the Executive Board of UNDP raised the indicative planning figure for Haiti to the level it was at before the recent budgetary cut of 30 per cent which affected all Member States. This is just one example, in our view, of how economic and political decisions complement each other. This is an example of the consistency needed within the framework of a strategy for sustainable human development in the post-conflict stage.

At the same time, we would like to refer to the potential of the General Assembly's recent resolution 49/139 B, regarding the participation of "White Helmets", volunteers in United Nations activities in the area of humanitarian assistance. This is on the understanding that this initiative will make it possible to channel into peace-keeping efforts all the energy that can be mobilized in the private sector. We are anxiously awaiting proposals that have been requested of the Secretary-General regarding the implementation of this mechanism.

Finally, we would like to mention the excellent experience accumulated over the past few years regarding assistance in electoral processes. This has allowed

conflicts that otherwise might have dragged on to be resolved harmoniously. In the post-conflict period much valuable experience has been acquired recently, experience upon which much can be built.

As regards cooperation and coordination between the United Nations and regional organizations, since the Agenda for Peace was first circulated there have been a number of instances of tasks being divided between our Organization and regional organizations of various levels and types. Although it is not a matter now of drawing up a balance sheet, we would say that on the whole the results have been positive, and we should encourage the continuation and strengthening of these experiences. We do not want to lay down strict guidelines for the modalities of such cooperation, although — just as an indication — we regard as relevant the principles set forth by the Secretary-General in paragraph 86 of his Supplement. We are convinced that these principles must be evaluated and applied on a case-by-case basis, since the subjects of this cooperation may be extremely diverse, depending on circumstances, as we have seen.

If a conflict is subject to direct action by the Council, it is evident that the most important part of the management of the conflict rests with the Council itself, and that the assignment of tasks and the division and coordination of work and responsibilities all fall within the scope of Security Council decisions. We must bear in mind the — at times — scant similarity between the procedures of the political bodies of different international organizations, and attempt to make them compatible. The same applies to the ability of regional bodies to react; the resources and information available to them; and the duration of the crisis, depending on the sphere it occurs in.

As regards disarmament, my delegation would like to make a few brief comments. Argentina believes that since the Summit meeting of the Security Council on 31 January 1992 significant progress has been made in the area of non-proliferation, disarmament and arms control. It is time to reaffirm that the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction is a threat to international peace and security, which falls under the jurisdiction of this Council. The Government of Argentina attaches special importance to the 1995 Conference on the review and extension of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons. The Congress of the nation approved the Treaty in law 24.448, and the ratification instruments are now being deposited.

My delegation fully agrees with the general guidelines laid down by the Secretary-General regarding "micro-disarmament". This can play a central role in the prevention of many conflicts. We are convinced that the proliferation of light weapons throughout the world and the illegal traffic in them are a complex challenge that must be faced immediately by the international community.

Regarding the proliferation of anti-personnel mines, we would like to repeat that my country, sharing the growing concern of the international community, has declared a five-year moratorium on their export, sale and transfer. We therefore support the establishment of a permanent regime to eliminate these weapons.

I shall now refer briefly to economic sanctions, an instrument almost as old as international relations themselves, since Pericles himself, in 432 B.C., first used them, in his memorable Megaria decree. The main thing to remember is that they are specifically to be found in Article 41 of the Charter as an instrument available to the Security Council. They have sometimes been used successfully, as in the case of the former Southern Rhodesia and later with regard to South Africa. However, since 1990 economic sanctions have been imposed repeatedly by the Security Council in various forms, and recent experience has shown, as the Secretary-General suggests in his report, that there must be an in-depth re-examination of the way in which the sanctions have been applied.

The case of Haiti, *inter alia*, is an example. On the one hand, sanctions were improved step by step, in so far as that was possible without losing their effectiveness, in order to try to focus them on those responsible in the de facto Government. At the same time, effective measures were planned to control the impact on the humanitarian situation and assure the supply of food and medicine.

The Argentine Republic believes that sanctions should be resorted to in exceptional cases and should be interpreted narrowly, for they are an instrument of deterrence or coercion, not a penalty.

It is time to review the procedures of the Sanctions Committees and the processes involved in renewing sanctions. We should consider periodically reviewing the various sanctions regimes in order to bring them into line with the conflicts that initiated them.

At the same time, these are a useful instrument available to the international community. Sanctions, even if because of their stigmatizing, can prevent or postpone

the use of a more serious measure: military force, which we should turn to only as a last resort. Therefore, economic sanctions must be used as a flexible instrument that is adapted to a particular situation and that can be adjusted when the political objectives established by the Council are attained.

The management of sanctions always requires a difficult combination of prudence, reasonableness and firmness. To be effective they must be rigorously precise and meticulously customized so as to reduce the possibility of causing unnecessary damage and of building up the resistance of those on whom they are imposed. They must be applied by the entire international community, and without exception, and with the same criteria. Furthermore, during the shortest possible period of time in which they can begin to take effect, we must be able to evaluate their results and their efficacy.

It should be pointed out that the utilization of sanctions has not yet been combined with the alternative of resorting simultaneously to incentives, so that reward and punishment are intertwined in coherent policy plans intended to influence or modify behaviour that threatens international peace and security. This alternative holds great possibilities and opens up a wide field for thinking about enriching the instruments at the disposal of the international community to make its work more effective and, perhaps, its policies less onerous.

Providing the United Nations with the necessary resources to deal with its responsibilities as the central institution in the conduct of international relations is the responsibility of all. The attainment of this objective will contribute significantly to the consolidation of peace in the world and will also enhance the Organization's credibility.

Obvious though it may be, it must be repeated — because of the considerable sums of money still owed to the United Nations — that there can be no effective operation without Member States' proper fulfilment of their financial responsibilities, in accordance with their clear obligations under the Charter.

With respect to the financial crisis affecting us, I wish to say that we should not shirk our responsibilities. We shall continue to work tirelessly in the framework of the General Assembly to respond to the Secretary-General's timely initiative and to try to provide permanent and suitable solutions. As long as some Member States are still very much in arrears in their contributions, the great potential of the United Nations for peace and development will never materialize. What is worse, the international community will continue to send a negative signal *vis-à-vis* the United Nations, that of a lack of genuine commitment to the ideals and principles that inspired its creation half a century ago.

I now resume my functions as President of the Council.

Mr. Mérimée (France) (*interpretation from French*): I have the honour to speak on behalf of the European Union.

I should like first to thank the Secretary-General for his excellent report entitled "Supplement to an Agenda for Peace: position paper of the Secretary-General on the occasion of the fiftieth anniversary of the United Nations". This important document provides timely help for the Council and the General Assembly to ponder in depth all facets of the objectives and means of maintaining international peace and security. It rounds out the important contribution of "An Agenda for Peace", which remains a useful basis for reflection by Member States.

The report of the Secretary-General quite rightly stresses the importance of preventive diplomacy and post-conflict peace-building. It emphasizes that the concept of peace-keeping, especially in the form of peace-keeping operations, is an irreplaceable instrument and that there is a need to improve the capacity for rapid deployment of United Nations troops. It takes into consideration various aspects of the resort to enforcement measures, military and non-military alike, and calls for caution in this regard. In all these areas the Secretary-General underlines the importance of cooperation between the United Nations and regional organizations.

Recourse to the methods of preventive diplomacy and peacemaking is the best means of preventing the outbreak or exacerbation of conflicts and of avoiding situations in which the Security Council must decide to launch a peace-keeping operation. Conflict prevention includes assistance to countries that are making progress towards democracy and the monitoring of elections. The establishment of and respect for human rights and the rights of individuals belonging to minorities, as well as measures to promote economic and social stability, are other basic elements of prevention.

We attach particular importance to preventive diplomacy. We support the intensification and improved

integration of efforts between the United Nations system and regional organizations in order to better identify situations that may give rise to conflicts.

We also support the initiatives of a number of countries, including European countries, that have provided the Secretary-General with a list of personalities, experts and resources likely to help the Secretariat to carry out fact-finding, mediation or good-offices missions in parts of the world where disputes may surface or be exacerbated. We support the Secretary-General's suggestion that the personalities so designated should also be available for long-term missions. We also support the efforts to ensure regular financing for preventive-diplomacy and peacemaking missions. By strengthening personnel and material resources available for United Nations preventive-diplomacy activities, we would be bolstering the confidence of the international community in the Organization's capacity in this field and helping make better use of the resources available to the United Nations as a whole.

I should like to take this opportunity to recall the European Union's support for the preventive deployment of troops, including stationing them on only one side of a border, in order to help stabilize a tense situation, where the consent of all the Governments concerned is lacking. Preventive deployment, such as that carried out in the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, should be used in other cases as well, whenever it seems useful and possible to do so.

In cases where a peace-keeping operation has been necessary, we believe it is legitimate and useful for the United Nations to maintain a presence on the ground after the end of the operation in order to ensure that its action is followed up in such a way as to contribute to a lasting restoration of peace through measures for coordinated consolidation in the economic, social, institutional, electoral, humanitarian and human rights fields. This method has already been proven on many occasions, particularly in Namibia and Cambodia. It deserves to be continued, as is intended in El Salvador and Mozambique. Indeed, it would be difficult to understand if, after having put so much effort into an operation that was probably burdensome, complex and costly, the United Nations were to withdraw without taking measures designed to secure the results. Peace-building activities can also be useful, without the deployment of a peace-keeping operation, to prevent conflict or remedy its consequences.

These measures could be planned from the outset in the mandates or the political agreements between the parties before the launching or in the course of an operation. In any case, the transfer to the competent bodies of the peace-building functions assumed within the framework of a peace-keeping operation should be planned and organized. We believe it is necessary to have a transitional phase between an operation under the aegis of the Security Council and actions that are the responsibility of other parts of the United Nations system, so as to preserve a political logic in the implementation of consolidation measures.

The question of rapid deployment of peace-keeping operations remains crucial. Speed of deployment depends largely on the capacity of Member States themselves to meet manpower and material needs. In this regard, we favour the idea of studying the stockpiling of reserves of the United Nations to use material left over from already completed operations already completed for the start-up phase of new operations. We also believe it to be necessary to improve — as has been shown by the time taken in the case of Bosnia and Herzegovina and Rwanda — arrangements for contacts between Governments which are contributing troops to the United Nations and those that are providing equipment. In this respect, we support the concept proposed by the Secretariat of calling upon Member States to equip and train battalions provided by other States in the form of an overall allocation within a given time-frame.

Arrangements relating to stand-by forces, the principle of which was endorsed in the Presidential statement on 27 July 1994, should make it possible to anticipate the planning phase of operations and to reduce the time between the adoption of a resolution and the deployment of a force. In principle, this system does not guarantee that contingents will be provided for a given operation, since States which agreed to participate are under no obligation to respond automatically. However, we think that if enough States commit themselves to it the system of stand-by force modules is an appropriate response to the question of rapid deployment. The European Union hopes that the Secretariat will continue to develop this concept and to attract support from other Member States. The European Union feels that particular attention should be given to the greatest possible capacity for interaction between contingents and that the system of stand-by forces should be supplemented by a similar exercise with regard to command structures and civilian components.

Other measures to improve the capacity for rapid deployment can be considered within a regional framework.

All the members of the Union are also members of the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe. Furthermore, the member countries of the European Union are either fully-fledged members or observers in the Western European Union and the North Atlantic Treaty Organization. In these bodies, procedures have been worked out to support peace-keeping operations and to contribute to them.

Particular attention should also be given to the improvement of peace-keeping capacity in Africa. The African countries, through the Organization of African Unity in particular, should also improve their internal cooperation as well as their cooperation with other organizations or Member States. This cooperation concerns the training of troops, stockpiling equipment and necessary logistical planning in order to mobilize urgently personnel and contingents for preventive diplomacy missions, humanitarian actions and peace-keeping operations under the United Nations. Members of the European Union are now considering arrangements for cooperation with African States within this context.

Furthermore, the European Union has noted with interest the Secretary-General's proposal to create a United Nations rapid reaction capacity. This proposal, however, should be examined most carefully in the light of its practical implications and its political and financial consequences.

It should also be recalled that an essential condition for the rapid deployment of peace-keeping forces is the availability of financial resources, particularly for the start-up phase. That is why the European Union stresses that it is imperative, for Member States, pursuant to their obligations under the Charter, to pay their assessments for the financing of activities they have approved.

Rapid deployment and, more generally, the success of peace-keeping operations, depend on the political will of States to shoulder their responsibilities for peace-keeping. This will should be strengthened by improving arrangements for consultation and exchange of information with countries providing contingents, as mentioned in the Presidential statement of 4 November 1994.

The Secretary-General in his report touches on the delicate question of enforcement measures, whether it be the imposition and effects of sanctions and the effects of them or military measures involving the use of force.

The European Union has supported the sanctions regimes against certain States or entities. These measures are indeed the only enforcement instrument, apart from the use of force. We consider that sanctions against States or entities which have contravened international law are not designed to punish their populations, but are an exceptional but necessary measure, when it comes to exerting pressure on a Government to bring about a change of attitude on its part where diplomatic means alone have proved inadequate to achieve this goal. Sanctions must have a precise goal. The acts of a State or entity which will make it possible to ease or lift sanctions must be defined when they are adopted. Sanctions should also be regularly examined. As to their effects, we believe that requests for exemption in connection with humanitarian activities must be examined rapidly by the relevant Committees in such a way as to prevent unnecessary suffering on the part of the civilian populations. Furthermore, we should continue to study, in particular having resort to the expertise of the Bretton Woods institutions, means of helping Member States which have suffered indirect damage because of the application of sanctions in the interests of international peace and security.

With regard to the use of force and military enforcement measures, a number of comments can be made. It is true that a peace-keeping operation is more likely to succeed if it is undertaken with the consent of the parties and without the use of force. It is always preferable, as the Secretary-General quite rightly points out, for the prestige and resources of the United Nations — and, indeed, those of Member States — not to be committed in an attempt to prevent a crisis or put an end to one, except within the framework of a process which enjoys the consent of the parties.

The fact remains that the use of force entails dangers for an operation if it does not possess the necessary military resources to face its consequences and if the conditions with regard to the definition of the mandate in the command structure and the conduct of operations have not been met.

The unfortunately fluctuating nature of crises faced by the international community should mean that we never reject the possibility — in the absence of the consent of the parties, and even against their will in certain exceptional circumstances, if the situation so

requires — of our Organization's deciding to have recourse to the enforcement measures provided for in Chapter VII of the Charter. Otherwise, we would collectively be sending a very negative signal about the Organization's will to ensure respect for international law.

The European Union wholeheartedly supports the intention of the Secretary-General to develop coordination and cooperation between the United Nations and regional organizations by means of consultation, diplomatic support, mutual operational support, co-deployment and joint operations in compliance with a number of principles: primacy of the United Nations in accordance with the Charter; clear-cut division of labour; and consistency, particularly with regard to the norms for peace-keeping. Furthermore, the European Union considers that the United Nations can, on a case-by- case basis, benefit from the delegation by the Security Council of certain operational tasks to regional organizations and arrangements.

We would hope in this regard that relations between the United Nations and regional arrangements and organs which, under Chapter VIII of the Charter, could help the work of preventive diplomacy and peace-keeping could be formalized even further in such a way as to be consistent with the objectives, field of activity and the capacities of each of these organizations.

The Security Council, to which any Member State may bring any dispute which poses a threat to international peace and security, should be kept informed of action taken or contemplated in this area by regional arrangements and organs. It should also be recalled that only the Security Council can mandate enforcement action in the case of a threat to the peace, breach of the peace or act of aggression.

I should like to end with two points.

The Secretary-General rightly stresses that civilian populations are the principal victims of current conflicts. In this regard, we, like him, are concerned at the proliferation of small-calibre weapons and anti-personnel mines. It is in this context that the European Union has proposed that consideration be given to a code of conduct for the transfer of conventional weapons. The commitment of the European Union has contributed a great deal to the progress made, within the framework of the Convention on the banning or limitation of the use of certain conventional weapons, to limit the export of anti-personnel mines. We should also like to recall the initiative taken by the European Union in the realm of mine-clearance assistance. We should also seek means of stemming the flow of small-calibre arms, which are helping to trigger and fuel conflicts.

Too often the work of the United Nations in the field of peace-keeping is misunderstood by public opinion. People seem to think either that this is the very essence of the Organization's work or that the failure of certain operations masks the success recorded elsewhere. We think that the tasks, the difficulties and the achievements of the United Nations should be part of a public relations policy that would make possible a proper appreciation of the efforts of the Organization. The European Union will support any action to this end.

It is also important for populations within the zones of United Nations operations to be informed as to the objectives and progress of the operations. The European Union will continue to support all efforts to this end.

In conclusion, the European Union, whose members have made a considerable contribution in support of the activities of the United Nations in the realm of the maintenance of international peace and security, considers that the Organization has a creditable record to date, despite all the setbacks that have occurred in certain cases.

The President *(interpretation from Spanish)*: Out of consideration for my colleagues, particularly for Ambassadors and delegations whose countries are not members of the Security Council, I should like to share my plan of work.

I propose that we should not go beyond 7 o'clock this evening and that we should then resume the meeting at 10 a.m. tomorrow. In other words, we would plan to begin — actually begin — at 10.15 or 10.20 and, God willing, end about noon or perhaps even a little earlier. Thus we should be spared the need to meet in the afternoon.

The next speaker is the representative of India. I invite him to take a place at the Council table and to make his statement.

Mr. Sreenivasan (India): My delegation is pleased, Sir, that this important debate is taking place under your sagacious presidency. We are particularly appreciative of your personal contribution to transparency in the functioning of the Security Council through your regular

briefing of the general membership on the formal and informal proceedings of the Council.

We have undertaken a preliminary analysis and assessment of the "Supplement to an Agenda for Peace", which has been thoughtfully prepared and presented by the Secretary-General as we enter the fiftieth anniversary year of the United Nations. We have taken note of the fact that the Secretary-General has presented his Supplement as a document of the fiftieth session of the General Assembly. As the issues addressed have direct and long-term implications for the work of the United Nations in fulfilling the objectives of the Charter, it is the expectation of my delegation that this debate of the Security Council is just the beginning of a series of wide-ranging discussions on the issues raised by the Secretary-General — a process that will necessarily continue in greater detail during the fiftieth session of the General Assembly. By then we shall have gained more experience in different areas and shall also have received the central documents on the Agenda for Peace and the Agenda for Development to which the Secretary-General referred in his press conference of 5 January 1995.

The focus of the "Supplement to an Agenda for Peace" is understandably on peace-keeping operations. This not only highlights the principal focus of United Nations activities in the recent past, but also underlines the need to restore the balance between peace-keeping operations and the vital activities of the United Nations in the economic and social sectors.

We are gratified to note that the clear lesson drawn in the Supplement from recent experience of peace-keeping operations is that respect for certain basic principles of peace-keeping is essential to success. These are consent, impartiality and the non-use of force except in cases of self-defence. We are equally gratified that the Secretary-General has highlighted the point that the logic of peace-keeping flows from political and military premises quite distinct from those of enforcement, and that the dynamics of the latter are incompatible with the political process that peace-keeping is intended to facilitate. We trust that the Security Council will bear these lessons of recent history in mind as it proceeds to deal with the challenging situations that lie ahead.

We agree with the Secretary-General that conflicts that the United Nations is asked to resolve usually have deep roots and have defied the peacemaking efforts of others, and that their resolution requires patience, diplomacy and the establishment of a political process that will lead to a mutually acceptable political settlement. We also agree that it is necessary to resist the temptation to use military power to speed up the process of resolution of conflicts. Peace-keeping and peace enforcement are indeed, clearly, alternative techniques.

In the section on sanctions, the Secretary-General has highlighted certain issues that should engage the serious attention of the international community in the light of recent experience. The issues raised by the Secretary-General are both philosophical and practical, and they are revealing and thought-provoking. As we address the overall question of sanctions, we trust that these issues will also be appropriately addressed. It is important to ensure that the means are as justifiable as the ends.

We have noted the Security Council's suggestion concerning the establishment of a mechanism to implement Article 50 of the Charter. We have long called for such a mechanism to be established. In our view, the mechanism should be established by the Security Council, and it must contain the element of automaticity of application. The Security Council could consider establishing a fund for this purpose financed from assessed contributions, as peace-keeping operations are, at the very time the Council imposes sanctions.

The Secretary-General has made in his Supplement some new proposals and also resuscitated some old yet significant ones made in "An Agenda for Peace". We have not had the time for a detailed examination of some of these proposals, yet it would be inappropriate for us not to convey our preliminary reaction to some of them, even at this stage.

The Secretary-General acknowledges in paragraph 6 of the Supplement that some of the ideas contained in "An Agenda for Peace" have not proved themselves. The unprecedented growth of peace-keeping operations has imposed a strain on Member States, resulting in a dearth of personnel and funding, even for mandated operations. The delay in the reimbursement of troop costs makes it difficult for developing countries to participate in the operations. In certain countries public opinion is agitated over the loss of peace-keepers' lives and the existing anomalies in death and disability benefits.

A pragmatic and realistic approach is clearly called for. It is obvious that the United Nations would be well advised to return to the traditional format of peace-keeping and to the customary caution with which

these operations were established. Barring peace-enforcement, and in exceptional cases where consent is a matter of practical and realistic impossibility, consent must be a prerequisite for United Nations activity. At the same time, my delegation is not at all sure that the United Nations should have an independent capacity for peace enforcement. Similarly, while India has agreed to contribute to stand-by forces as presently constituted, we doubt the validity of the concept of a standing force for the United Nations.

The suggestion that there is need to create a climate of opinion or ethos within the international community in which the norm would be for Member States to accept the offer of United Nations good offices is well taken. However, this needs to be thought through. Good offices are efforts under Chapter VI and are predicated on the consent of the parties concerned. The creation of norms, automatically applicable, would lead to dilution of the principle of consent and, on application, the confusion between peace-keeping and peace-enforcement, which the Secretary-General has clearly presented as mutually exclusive, would return. Similarly, we feel it necessary to urge caution with respect to the proposal for establishing small field missions. These, unless closely monitored and approved only after inter-governmental scrutiny, could easily lead to long-term and expensive entanglements.

The Secretary-General has, in his Supplement, rightly pointed out that the discussions initiated in 1994 for the elaboration of an "Agenda for Development" have also served to advance international consensus on the crucial importance of economic and social development as the most secure basis for lasting peace. It is also his understanding that his Supplement to the Agenda for Peace is just for reflection and discussion, while the focus for discussions during the next six months should be on the Agenda for Development. We fully share the Secretary-General's belief that the focus during 1995 must be on the Agenda for Development. As I have already indicated, it is imperative that the balance between the United Nations activities on the maintenance of international peace and security on the one hand and economic and social activities on the other be urgently restored. For this purpose, the present momentum in the discussions on an Agenda for Development must be maintained.

Earlier in the debate the Permanent Representative of Indonesia, in his capacity as the Chairman of the Non-Aligned Movement, addressed the Council. My delegation would like to associate itself with his statement.

Before I conclude, may I take this opportunity to reiterate my Government's continuing commitment to the objectives of the United Nations. Further, India will continue, as in the past, to effectively participate in United Nations peace-keeping operations, as part of its consistent and principled contribution to the maintenance of international peace and security.

The President (*interpretation from Spanish*): I thank the representative of India for his kind words addressed to me and to my delegation.

The next speaker is the representative of Malaysia. I invite him to take a place at the Council table and to make his statement.

Mr. Razali (Malaysia): Mr. President, you and your colleagues have begun the year on a promising note by initiating steps towards greater transparency in the work of the Council. The Malaysian delegation would like to commend you for these initiatives, which we hope will be institutionalized as part of the efforts to make the Council truly representative as well as being well placed to address the needs of the Member States.

I would also like to record my deep appreciation to your predecessor, the Permanent Representative of Rwanda, for having steered the Council last month.

We recall that the precursor to this report — namely, the Agenda for Peace — was in itself prepared in response to a request by the Council. The debate on the issues raised within the Agenda for Peace evoked, and in fact continues to evoke, mixed reactions within and outside the United Nations, developing into a continuing debate as the issues raised deal with questions of international peace and security, with substantial focus on the United Nations peacekeeping activities.

In the General Assembly itself the debate culminated in resolutions 47/120 A and B, entitled "An Agenda for Peace." Yet reading the current report as contained in document A/50/60, entitled "Supplement to an Agenda for Peace", we are not sure that it is meant for the consideration of the General Assembly, particularly when it is noted that this report makes no specific reference to the General Assembly resolutions 47/120 A and B.

We hope, too, that the introduction of this report at this point, during the work of the United Nations will not deflect attention from the urgent need to adopt an Agenda for Development. Indeed, resolution 47/120 A, among

others, recognized — in its seventh preambular paragraph — that "An Agenda for Peace" would need to be complemented with "An Agenda for Development",

> "to strengthen the socio-economic development of Member States as one of the means of enhancing international peace and security."

As we are all aware, the progress on an Agenda for Development has been limited and slow.

This morning and for part of this afternoon we non-Council members, belonging to the general membership, have had the benefit of listening to the positions of Council members. Some of the statements made, I regret to say, reflect entrenched national positions, surely not fully taking into account the positive and negative experiences at the United Nations on issues dealing with peace and security and the mechanism of peace-keeping and peace-making. I also regret to say that from their entrenched positions the few will try to continue to dictate the discourse on, and examination in the Council of, this multifaceted issue. My delegation believes that the Agenda for Peace and all attendant issues are better served by discussion in the General Assembly.

I would like to make a few comments on the Secretary-General's paper: First, the members of the United Nations will no doubt be relieved that, unlike the first report, the current report underlines the importance of the principle of consent, a principle strongly advocated by developing countries. Secondly, the current report also addresses in a forthright manner the issue of sanctions. The call to take appropriate measures to address the impact of sanctions on third parties enjoys widespread support within the membership of the United Nations. While the sanctions regime has often been vigorously enforced in the context of specific instances and some countries, the need to address on an urgent and priority basis the needs of those adversely affected by sanctions has not been resolved. Similarly, sanctions serving the specific political agenda of a few Council members should not be condoned. Sanctions of the United Nations cannot be seen as a political vendetta in promotion of special interests. If the Council's action is to represent a genuine process of collective opprobrium, its implications, proportionality and reasons for continued enforcement must bear the result of a continuing collective examination. In this regard, the recommendation contained in paragraph 75 of the report of the Secretary-General deserves the full support of all Member States.

The report of the Secretary-General is excessively centred on the Security Council and has limited comments involving the important role of the General Assembly, a point highlighted in resolution 47/120 B. Taking into account the fact that all these conflicts continue to take place in areas of the developing world, the role of the General Assembly should not be marginalized. After all, the first United Nations peace-keeping operation was set up by the General Assembly, which has the power to establish peace-keeping operations as well. Accordingly, the report should spell out specific measures in which the General Assembly could be involved, not only in peace-keeping but also in the larger question of international peace and security.

On the observation by the Secretary-General, contained in paragraph 39, that the Security Council increasingly tends to micro-manage peace-keeping operations, Malaysia holds the view that this is a reflection of the dysfunctional relationship between the Council and the Secretariat. This situation has arisen primarily as a result of the preponderant influence of some powerful members of the Council as well as the excessive reliance on the financial contributions of some of these members. Lessons should be learned from this situation. As for the Secretariat itself, we have high regard for the competence and professionalism of the senior officials dealing with peace-keeping. At the same time, with an annual budget of more than $3 billion the Secretary-General must put his house in order, just as the Council must discharge its responsibilities consistently without resort to double standards and selectivity. At the end of the day, it is important that leadership be provided in partnership from the General Assembly, the Security Council and the Secretariat.

On the issue of consultations between troop-contributing countries and the Council, the report should spell out further means to enhance the consultations as well as to implement Article 44 of the Charter. This is an issue on which advance work has been done and we hope that the process of consultations between the troop-contributing countries and the Council will be institutionalized.

On disarmament, the Secretary-General admits that he has chosen to "concentrate on what might be called 'micro-disarmament'" (*S/1995/1, para 60*). Although he has endeavoured to elaborate on "micro-disarmament", generally a euphemism for light weapons, he has not highlighted the important role of the key producers and exporters of these so-called light weapons. The

Permanent Five, which enjoy special powers in this very Council on issues of international peace and security, are also the world's leading arms traders. They have it within their power to promote genuine and complete disarmament — nuclear and weapons of mass destruction. A recent issue of the Harvard International Review has catalogued the various issues relating to the arms bazaar, which constitutes a major threat to international peace and security. It has also further catalogued the role of the major Powers in this context. Overall, the impression is created that the Secretary-General has, on this issue, shied away from his own stated desire for hard decisions.

On the issue of a rapid reaction force, referred to in paragraph 44, we would like to seek clarification, considering that a number of countries have agreed to have stand-by arrangements for peace-keeping. In fact, I wish to take this opportunity to announce the decision of the Malaysian Government to participate in the stand-by arrangements.

Finally, the request, as reflected in paragraph 32, for a certain amount of discretion in the use of a proposed contingency provision of $25 million per biennium would seem to indicate a desire to act independently. This proposal has come at a time when audit reports have revealed instances of serious financial mismanagement in the various United Nations peace-keeping operations. Hence, Member States may find it difficult to allow for this discretionary flexibility, given the poor management record.

These observations are not exhaustive. My delegation would be ready to examine further, in the Council or General Assembly, the issues raised in this report, in an effort to bring about collective responsibility on this important issue.

The President (*interpretation from Spanish*): The next speaker is the representative of Ukraine. I call on him to take a place at the Council table and to make his statement.

Mr. Zlenko (Ukraine): I should like to join you, Mr. President, in conveying my Government's sorrow and condolences to the people of Japan, including the families who lost loved ones during the horrible earthquake there.

(*spoke in Spanish*)

Allow me at the outset to join in the congratulations that have been extended to you, Sir, on your assumption of the presidency of the Security Council. Directing the work of one of the most important bodies of the United Nations entails shouldering great responsibilities and making decisions that affect the future. It is a great honour for a diplomat and politician. In recent days, we have had occasion to witness your diplomatic skills, your tact and your ability to relate to colleagues. All of this has contributed to the constructive decisions that have been adopted in connection with certain complicated international problems.

I also wish to express my appreciation to the Ambassador of Rwanda for his successful work as President of the Council in December.

At the beginning of this, my first statement before the Security Council this year, I wish to extend a warm welcome to the new non-permanent members of the Council. The States Members of the United Nations have placed great confidence in them. I express my appreciation to the five members of the Council that have carried out with dignity the difficult mission entrusted to them by the international community.

(*spoke in Russian*)

The dramatic changes that have occurred throughout the world in recent times are, to varying degrees connected with the end of the cold war. Not all of these changes have justified the hopes of the peoples of the world for peaceful, safe and stable development. This is primarily because the positive processes around the world have not been pursued, while the negative trends and phenomena have not been identified or prevented in good time. As a result, old threats have been exaggerated while the international community has minimized new, more destructive threats.

In this context, the position paper of the Secretary-General of the United Nations, "Supplement to An Agenda for Peace", is in our view an attempt to assess and respond to the many current challenges connected primarily with the emergence of a new generation of conflicts. The poison of ethnic and religious intolerance has increasingly afflicted States and even entire regions, giving rise to a dangerous corrosion of the emergent post-confrontational system of international relations.

How can we not be concerned at the fact that such conflicts are so often accompanied by unprecedented violations of human rights and are marked by considerable casualties among peaceful civilians? This is a challenge to the very basis of their rights - that is, the

right to life. The defence of human rights in contemporary circumstances can no longer be considered as the exclusively domestic affair of a given State.

In this regard, promoting the observance of human rights and cooperating with the United Nations in this sphere - including the dispatch of fact-finding verification missions - should be a moral injunction, incumbent upon all States without exception. Such missions will, in our view, promote the creation of a climate of freedom from fear, which, as Dag Hammarskjöld said, is the quintessence of the whole philosophy of human rights.

In our view, the part of the position paper in which the Secretary-General sets forth his view of the role and place of individual instruments for ensuring peace and security within the peacemaking activities of the United Nations are worthy of our particular attention. In this connection, I should like to draw the Council's attention to a truth which is as old as the world itself but which, unfortunately, is often disregarded: an ounce of prevention is worth a pound of cure. That is why placing stress on active preventive diplomacy that would make it possible to avert new conflicts should become the hallmark of the work of the United Nations in the area of maintaining international peace and security.

The delegation of Ukraine believes that the United Nations must make active use, both bilaterally and multilaterally, of its potential for persuasion *vis-à-vis* the parties to a conflict. It is important constantly to expand and bring into active play a whole arsenal of methods of persuasion, so as to prevail upon the leadership of those parties to make use of the Organization's peacemaking services. And insistence on this should not be viewed by States as an attempt to interfere in their domestic affairs. This role, in our view, could be entrusted to the standing institution of international mediators being set up in the Office of the Secretary-General. It could include the most authoritative and eminent politicians and statesmen, representing all continents. At the same time, they could be entrusted with certain functions of other instruments for ensuring peace and security — in particular, post-conflict peace-building, an important element of which is monitoring of elections.

Another important aspect of preventive diplomacy is that of seeking individual approaches to emerging conflicts. In our view, this is a task that could be successfully performed only by professional conflict specialists who had been formally trained and would be represented within the structure of the United Nations Secretariat — for example, within the Department of Peace-keeping Operations.

An analysis of recent successes and failures in peace-keeping operations shows that an imperative in producing the mandate for operations and in laying down their fundamental principles is clear-cut observance of universally accepted norms of international law, in particular respect for sovereignty, territorial integrity and inviolability of frontiers.

Many practical difficulties in the sphere of the command and management of peace-keeping operations could, in our view, be performed by revitalizing provisions of the Charter of the United Nations that, in our view, have been forgotten — and wrongly so. I refer in particular to Article 47, which defines the role and functions of the Military Staff Committee. According to paragraph 4 of that Article, that Committee,

> "with the authorization of the Security Council and after consultation with appropriate regional agencies, may establish regional sub-committees".

The delegation of Ukraine believes it would be appropriate to consider the question of expanding this practice and also the possibility of including in the membership of these regional sub-committees representatives of appropriate countries that are contributing troops to peace-keeping operations deployed in a given region.

In the final analysis, the success of peace-keeping operations depends to a large extent on swift deployment of national contingents provided by States to the United Nations. In this regard, Ukraine has supported the idea of the creating of, and has given its assent to participation in, what is known as a United Nations reserve force. At the same time, experience has shown that the existence of a reserve force does not in itself lead to bringing it swiftly into play. In these circumstances, the Secretary-General's proposal for the creation of a rapid reaction force is in our view worthy of our attention. This would be a strategic reserve for the Security Council, prepared for deployment in case of an urgent need for the dispatch of a peace-keeping force. We believe that the availability to the United Nations of such units would in itself exercise a restraining effect on the actions of potential parties to a conflict.

In our view, the need also arises for further study of such elements of this idea as command of the force and criteria for representatives of national contingents in a peace-keeping force. Here, criteria should take into account historical, political and geographical factors.

The active application of sanctions raises a multitude of questions, which the Secretary-General has attempted to answer in his position paper. While paying a tribute to the efforts of the Secretary-General to this end, I should like to share with the Council our own views on this score.

A fundamental contradiction in the practice of sanctions is that when they are introduced the main foundation is the interest of the international community, but when they are lifted the dominant factor is national interests - sometimes not even genuine ones - on the part of individual States. Furthermore, a particularly glaring contradiction lies in the interpretation of the degree to which the goals of sanctions have been attained, an interpretation based on a subjective appreciation by States of their end results. In recent years, in connection with the active use by the Security Council of economic enforcement measures as an important instrument of international efforts to resolve regional conflicts, the problem of the negative consequences of sanctions in general and their effect on outside countries in particular has taken on an entirely new resonance.

The Security Council imposes sanctions on behalf of the whole international community. Therefore, all its members should bear the responsibility for their implementation and their consequences. The urgent need to help countries that have encountered difficulties, as a result of the application of sanctions, in solving their special economic problems is recognized by practically everyone today. This is also recognized in the position paper of the Secretary-General. But this, in our view, is clearly inadequate. What we need are bold and concrete proposals, appropriate practical steps, both on the part of the international community as a whole and on the part of its individual members.

In this regard, we believe it appropriate to return once again to the question of creating a special compensatory mechanism that would include a compensation fund. What requires further study as one of the possible elements of this mechanism is the question of reducing the contribution for the financing of peace-keeping operations by the total losses which would have been calculated by United Nations methodology. Here, the functions of appreciation of the economic losses already sustained by States, study of the economic, political and social consequences of the application of sanctions, coordination of efforts to minimize their consequences for the most vulnerable groups of the population and also for outside countries, and monitoring of their implementation could be entrusted to a standing committee of the Security Council on sanctions.

The inability of the world community to provide a swift and effective answer to the problems arising from the application of sanctions may undermine trust in the very institution of sanctions and call into question the very principle of collective activity in the implementation of enforcement measures by the United Nations.

Our analysis of the position paper presented by the Secretary-General is by no means exhausted by the points I have already made. Regarding the report as a point of departure for a thoroughgoing discussion of ways and means of enhancing the capacity of the world community to react effectively to the challenges of the day, the Ukrainian delegation intends to take an active part in the work on a comprehensive concept of peacemaking activity on the part of the United Nations in the twenty-first century.

The President (*interpretation from Spanish*): I thank the representative of Ukraine for the kind words he addressed to my delegation in Spanish.

The next speaker is the representative of Pakistan. I invite him to take a place at the Council table and to make his statement.

Mr. Marker (Pakistan): Permit me, Mr. President, to associate my delegation with your remarks and to express our sincerest condolences to the Government and people of Japan and to our colleague, Ambassador Owada, on the tragedy and loss of life that has resulted from the devastating earthquake in that beautiful country.

My delegation is grateful to the Secretary-General for the most valuable and thought-provoking supplement to his report of June 1992 entitled "An Agenda for Peace". We have read the Supplement with great interest. Indeed, the "position paper", as the Secretary-General describes the document, makes some very pertinent points and contains some far-reaching suggestions. Since the position paper is now being carefully examined by my Government, the comments that I wish to offer today are necessarily preliminary in nature.

Let me express our hope that in due course this supplementary report will be discussed in the General Assembly also and that, in view of other pressing matters that engage the attention of the general membership, sufficient time will be allowed before any decisions or decisions are made. As a major troop-contributor to United Nations peace-keeping, Pakistan will maintain a close and positive interest in this issue.

The Secretary-General has rightly pointed out that the end of the cold war led to a period of hope and change and rising expectations from the United Nations. In fact, what has happened is that a world marred by super-Power rivalry has been replaced by one riven by numerous inter-State and intra-State conflicts. While the United Nations has scored notable successes in some trouble spots, such as Cambodia, South Africa and Mozambique, in others the results have been disappointing.

The position paper graphically presents the rapid increase in United Nations activities related to peace and security over the last six years. Today, peace-keeping is a major United Nations activity involving contingents from dozens of countries. The number of military personnel deployed on peace-keeping duties has increased sixfold since 1988, while the financial outlay required to meet the peace-keeping demands on the United Nations has gone up more than 15 times. In the light of these developments as well as those mentioned in the Secretary-General's report, the importance that he has placed on the subject of peace and security is fully understandable. My delegation would wish to pay a particular tribute to the Department of Peace-keeping Operations for the initiatives and the innovative approach that have characterized the work of this Department in dealing with the difficult circumstances that have prevailed in the recent past.

We endorse the Secretary-General's view that it is far better to prevent conflicts than to undertake major politico-military efforts to resolve them after they have broken out. It is unfortunate that States, while continuing to announce their commitment to resolving disputes peacefully, balk at proposals for United Nations help. The Secretary-General has rightly called for the creation of a climate of opinion, or international ethos, in which the norm would be for Member States to accept an offer of United Nations good offices.

The Secretary-General has also correctly identified some of the practical problems confronted in the sphere of peace-keeping. Unity of command is, in our view, an important principle, especially when a peace-keeping mission is operating in a dangerous or hostile environment. The experience of the United Nations operation in Somalia, where more than 100 United Nations peace-keepers lost their lives, provided a dramatic and poignant emphasis to this point. Another important aspect of peace-keeping operations is to keep the troop-contributing Governments fully informed and abreast of the situation where their troops are deployed, as well as to consult them before taking decisions having a bearing on the mandate as well as the welfare of their contingents.

We have noted with interest the idea of a rapid-reaction force to act as the Security Council's strategic reserve for deployment. The idea would need to be further developed before it could be seriously considered by the general membership of the United Nations. The idea of establishing a reserve stock of standard peace-keeping equipment also needs to be examined with care.

The importance of disarming the sides involved in a civil war or an internal conflict is well established. United Nations efforts in this regard met with success in Mozambique. However, in Somalia the consequences were quite disastrous. The obvious conclusion is that "micro-disarmament" works when there is a prior agreement between the parties involved and there is also the political will on their part to honour their commitments. As for arms trafficking, we agree with the Secretary-General that this problem can be effectively tackled on a regional basis.

The Secretary-General has raised some very pertinent issues as regards the subject of sanctions. The increasing use of the instrument of sanctions by the Security Council has led to many difficulties for countries that are neither involved in the crisis situation nor consulted on the Council's decision that led to the imposition of sanctions. We accept that the decisions of the Security Council are binding for the entire United Nations membership. However, at the same time we strongly believe that the problems created for third countries as a result of Council decisions ought to be effectively addressed. In this context we welcome the suggestion of the Secretary-General to establish a mechanism to, *inter alia*, explore ways of assisting Member States that are suffering collateral damage due to Security Council sanctions and to evaluate claims of such States under Article 50. This could prove to be an important step towards institutionalizing a system whereby the burdens placed on third countries as a result

of Security Council-imposed sanctions are equitably shared by all United Nations Member States.

The authority of the United Nations to take enforcement action against those responsible for threatening or breaching the peace is enshrined in the Charter. But once aggression has taken place and been recognized by the Security Council and a decision has been taken by it, then the United Nations — or, more specifically, the Security Council — is compelled to rely on the Member States to implement the terms of that decision. Despite the precedents of the Security Council's authorizing a group of Member States to take enforcement action against a delinquent State, the need for the Council to exercise the utmost discretion and care in this regard cannot be overemphasized. In authorizing enforcement action, the Security Council should in all instances clearly establish the act of aggression and ensure that its action has the support of the general membership of the United Nations.

In conclusion, while expressing support for the statement made by the Ambassador of Indonesia on behalf of the Non-Aligned Movement, I wish to state that we hope to refine and expand our position on the various subjects handled in the position paper as the discussions on them proceed.

The President (*interpretation from Spanish*): The next speaker is the representative of Poland. I invite him to take a place at the Council table and to make his statement.

Mr. Wlosowicz (Poland): Let me begin by wishing you, Mr. President, and all the other members of the Security Council a most prosperous and healthy new year and by congratulating you on your assumption of the presidency of the Security Council for the month of January. I should also like to thank your predecessor, Ambassador Bakuramutsa of Rwanda, for presiding over the Council's work in December 1994.

We join you, Mr. President, and the Security Council in expressing sincere condolences to the families of the victims of the deadly earthquake that struck the region of Kobe in Japan two days ago. May I ask the Permanent Representative of Japan to convey this message of sympathy to his Government and to all those who are mourning their loved ones.

Poland welcomes the "Supplement to an Agenda for Peace", submitted by the Secretary-General on the occasion of the fiftieth anniversary of the Organization. Aimed at improving United Nations performance in the main area of the Organization's responsibility — namely, the protection of international peace and security — the document contains both an evaluation of United Nations achievements and a number of inspiring ideas regarding the future of the United Nations.

We believe that the Secretary-General rightly emphasizes that the United Nations offers the best and most promising avenues to address current and possible future threats to international peace and security. This was true in the not-too-distant past, and it is so now, when we are witnessing a significant rise in intra-State, often violent, conflicts, as opposed to the inter-State wars more frequent in the cold-war world. We share the Secretary-General's view that sustainable and harmonious social and economic development constitutes the best remedy for those conflicts. It is with this in mind that Poland will continue to support the work of the social and economic sectors of the Organization, as they are both an important element of the early-warning system and an indispensable instrument of post-conflict reconstruction. The Polish delegation shares the Secretary-General's view that the way we deal with today's qualitatively new threats to international security has to correspond better to the root causes and nature of these threats.

Further discussion is needed on the development of the concepts of preventive diplomacy, conflict management and post-conflict recovery. The regional organizations are in a position to contribute significantly to this discussion. Development of the cooperation between them and the United Nations would greatly facilitate our work. I am thinking in particular about the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe, which has garnered significant and unique experience while dealing with the peace and security problems in the area perhaps most affected by the post-cold-war changes.

It is also our view that peace-keeping operations will continue to be a main instrument in managing crisis situations for the foreseeable future. The Secretary-General is right when he calls for an urgent, in-depth and up-to date examination of United Nations performance in this respect. No doubt the overall picture which emerges from such an examination will be positive. But there is still room for further improvement. United Nations peace-keeping should be fully mandated and better planned, organized and financed.

There is potential for improvement in the United Nations peace-keeping operations through certain readjustments to coordination mechanisms within the

Organization itself, as well as between the Secretariat and the contributors concerned. We recognize the complexity of this issue. The best thing that we can and should do now is to address them fully and sincerely with a clear will to come to satisfactory conclusions. A part of that work has already been done. We thank the delegations of Canada, Norway and the Netherlands for their efforts to facilitate the discussion on the refinement of the peace-keeping mechanisms.

At this point I would like to mention the Polish participation in United Nations peace-keeping operations. About 2,000 Polish troops are now serving under the United Nations banner. The peace-keeping training center in the Polish city of Kielce became operational more than a year ago. Poland has committed itself to designating a logistic unit to be included in the United Nations stand-by forces in 1996. May I assure the Council that in the future Poland will also do its best to respond positively to United Nations requests.

Poland attaches particular importance to the issue of collective sanctions, which is extensively dealt with in the Secretary-General's position paper. Appropriately and carefully designed and applied sanctions are now, and will remain, an indispensable instrument at the disposal of the international community. Poland stands ready to take part in a detailed discussion on this subject.

Our approach to the sanctions has been best defined by the Polish Minister for Foreign Affairs, who, in a statement to the General Assembly, said that there should be arrangements alleviating the burdens incurred by countries which participate in economic measures against the offender State and that it was clear that Article 50 of the Charter did not constitute a sufficient remedy.

Finally, the adverse implications of the United Nations current financial situation for the improvement of the United Nations peace-keeping capabilities cannot be overlooked. There are not many countries in a position to claim a flawless performance in this regard. Having said that, I should like to point out that in many cases those countries' conscientiousness in discharging their financial obligations depends heavily on the punctuality of reimbursement to them for outlays they made earlier in regard to their country's participation in peace-keeping operations.

These are the initial remarks offered by the Polish delegation at this juncture of our deliberations.

I should like to thank you once again, Mr. President, for convening this important meeting and to declare our readiness to contribute further to the discussion.

The President *(interpretation from Spanish)*: I thank the representative of Poland for the kind words addressed to my delegation.

The next speaker is the representative of the Netherlands. I invite him to take a place at the Council table and to make his statement.

Mr. Biegman (Netherlands): Let me congratulate you, Sir, on the assumption of the presidency of the Security Council for the month of January.

May I also express my delegation's sincere condolences to the Government of Japan on the occasion of the terrible disaster that struck the Kobe region yesterday.

I am happy to have the opportunity to address the Council on the important matter under discussion today, which has already been the subject of an intervention by the French delegation on behalf of the European Union. We subscribe entirely to the views put forward in that intervention, but would like to make a few additional remarks.

As a substantial contributor to United Nations peace-keeping and crisis-management, the Netherlands attaches great importance to the strengthening of the United Nations capacity in this domain and to the views and recommendations put forward in the Secretary-General's Agenda for Peace. This is a crucial element of the United Nations response to the new challenges confronting the international community after the end of the cold war.

The timely and thought-provoking position paper of the Secretary-General, which has been presented as a Supplement to his Agenda for Peace, describes the dramatic changes in both the volume and the nature of United Nations activities in the field of peace and security which have occurred since the Agenda was written. These changes call for reflection, and I would like to address a number of the issues raised in the Supplement.

In the report, the Secretary-General stresses the importance of preventive diplomacy. But, as he points out, the greatest obstacle to its successful application is

the reluctance of one or other of the parties in a conflict to accept an active role for the United Nations. The hope is expressed that in the long run the international climate of opinion will evolve in such a way that it will become established practice for countries not to refuse an offer of United Nations good offices. The Netherlands shares this view, but it would be useful, I think, to discuss in somewhat more detail what we can do to bring about such a climate. The coming celebration of the fiftieth anniversary of the United Nations next October would provide a good opportunity to this end. I would suggest that the Heads of State and Government incorporate in their declarations on that occasion a solemn reaffirmation of their willingness to accept an offer of good offices by the United Nations in conflicts to which they may become a party. This could constitute a code of conduct for Member States in the field of preventive diplomacy.

We warmly welcome the conclusion of the Secretary-General that the idea of a rapid reaction force deserves serious attention and we fully share his analysis. As will be recalled, the Netherlands Minister of Foreign Affairs in his intervention during the forty-ninth session of the General Assembly also argued in favour of such a force. In particular, he mentioned the possibility of creating an all-volunteer, professional United Nations brigade at the service of the Security Council, a brigade which could be rapidly deployed in a crisis situation. The personnel of such a brigade would have no links with the armed forces of Member States and would be directly contracted by the United Nations. This would seem to be the best way to guarantee that these units would actually be available in an emergency, as the use of units which would remain part of national forces would still be subject to often time-consuming national decision-making, including, in many cases, parliamentary approval. Moreover, the outcome of this decision-making would not necessarily be positive. The Netherlands has undertaken a preliminary internal study as to the feasibility and modalities of such a United Nations brigade, and intends to further pursue this option in consultations with Member States and the Secretariat in the very near future.

In his "Supplement to An Agenda for Peace" the Secretary-General makes a clear distinction between peace-keeping and peace-enforcing. If we understand the text correctly, the Secretary-General argues that we should return to the classical type of peace-keeping operations, based on the consent of all parties, impartiality and non-use of force. New elements, such as the protection of safe areas and of humanitarian operations during continuing warfare, as well as putting pressure on the parties, endanger the success of the peace-keeping formula, especially if the peace-keepers lack the capability for the effective use of force, so the argument goes. Of course, the Netherlands agrees that the capabilities of the peace-keeping forces should be sufficient to meet the requirements of the mandate. Mandate and means should be well-balanced. However, the answer is not, in our view, to limit ourselves to the kind of peace-keeping that was appropriate for a world which was very different from the one we are now living in. As the Supplement makes clear, the nature of the problem confronting the international community has changed as a result of the recent wave of intra-State conflicts and the phenomenon of the failed State. The responsibility of the United Nations for the maintenance of peace and security makes it incumbent upon the Organization to devise ways to address these new threats. In the case of massive violations of human rights and humanitarian emergencies it may become unavoidable to combine peace-keeping operations with elements of enforcement.

I agree that there is a real possibility of contradiction and confusion, and that the United Nations force may face situations of a very difficult and delicate nature. However, my country does not draw the conclusion from the experiences in, for instance, Bosnia and Herzegovina that we have given the United Nations Protection Force (UNPROFOR) the wrong mandate. On the contrary, UNPROFOR's capabilities should be strengthened and its vulnerability reduced, so that it can indeed perform its existing mandate.

In his Supplement, the Secretary-General also refers to the new interaction between the Council and the troop-contributing countries. The Netherlands has repeatedly emphasized the importance of enhanced transparency and better consultations with troop- contributing countries that are not members of the Council. The new procedures decided upon recently by the Council have already resulted in improved information and consultations on the operations mandated by the Council, and I hope further progress will be made in this respect. This is a legitimate expectation on the part of those countries which, while not on the Council, are nevertheless major contributors to United Nations peace-keeping operations and thus instrumental in the implementation of the Council's decisions. This enhanced involvement of the troop contributors in the political process is also important in order to maintain domestic public support. It can be realized without encroaching on the special responsibilities of the Council or the Secretary-General.

The Council must have flexibility in its choice of instruments while trying to maintain or restore international peace and security. The Charter specifically mentions sanctions as one of the instruments for this purpose. The Secretary-General rightly observes that sanctions often have unwanted side-effects.

The experience gained since 1990 tells us that a mechanism such as that proposed by the Secretary-General may give a sharper edge to what he calls a blunt instrument. The effectiveness and credibility of the sanctions instrument, applied in conformity with the Charter, would certainly be improved if some of the Secretary-General's recommendations were adopted.

But — especially if there should be a reduction in military enforcement activities on the part of the United Nations, as proposed by the Secretary-General — the Organization will have to make sure that it does not lose the only remaining means of action in cases of threats to the peace, breaches of the peace or acts of aggression. The Netherlands, in cooperation with Australia, intends to address various questions related to the effective application of sanctions in a working paper to be presented on the occasion of the United Nations Congress on Public International Law, which will take place in New York in March 1995.

In reading the Supplement, I was particularly pleased with the emphasis that the Secretary-General puts on the concept of post-conflict peace-building. This should include the transition from humanitarian assistance to development cooperation — a vital instrument in the promotion of international peace and security. Achieving synergy between the different organizations concerned should be an important goal, and we wholeheartedly support the Secretary-General in his efforts aimed at greater coordination in the field.

Let me conclude by stating that we welcome the attention that the Supplement gives to regional organizations. The cooperation between these organizations and the United Nations seems to be evolving in the right direction. The Secretary-General is correct in stating that a universal model for their relationship with the United Nations cannot be established. The primacy of the United Nations, so far as enforcement is concerned, has been laid down in the Charter and must be respected. However, this does not preclude a division of labour between United Nations and regional organizations, which, in the opinion of my country, should be based on considerations of comparative advantage. Individual tasks should be performed by the organization best equipped to do them. In this way, duplication and institutional competition can be avoided, and the effectiveness of our common effort will be enhanced.

The President *(interpretation from Spanish)*: I thank the representative of the Netherlands for his gracious words addressed to me.

The next speaker is the representative of Turkey. I invite him to take a seat at the Council table and to make his statement.

Mr. Batu (Turkey): Let me take a moment to extend our heartfelt condolences over the terrible loss of life caused by the recent earthquake in Japan.

I wish to express our appreciation to the Secretary-General for providing us with his "Supplement to An Agenda for Peace", which is before the Security Council today for its consideration.

At the time of its release, the report, "An Agenda For Peace", was a compelling endeavour to remind the international community of the urgency of the need to strengthen the capabilities and arrangements of the United Nations with a view to enabling the Organization to bear, in a more effective and efficient manner, the ever-increasing burden of maintaining peace and security around the globe. The extensive and voluminous debate that the Agenda has generated thus far is testimony to the timeliness of the Secretary-General's initiative.

Since then there have been enormous changes in the international scene — some of them encouraging, but mostly disheartening. In relation to these changes, the burdens on the United Nations have increased dramatically. The Organization is going through a serious soul-searching about its role, its effectiveness and its credibility, almost on a daily basis.

In view of these most recent developments, and given that this year we celebrate the fiftieth anniversary of the United Nations, we believe that the Secretary-General's "Supplement to the Agenda for Peace" is a valuable and timely step forward to highlight the areas where difficulties regarding the initiatives and ideas that have been put forth in the Agenda have arisen.

We warmly support the point made by the Secretary-General in his position paper that it is better to prevent conflicts than to try to handle them after they

have broken out. Indeed, the idea of preventing disputes in a peaceful manner is embodied in the letter and the spirit of the Charter. In fact, this is not only a desirable and ideal method of controlling and resolving conflicts, but also the most cost-effective way of doing so. To this effect, we have noted with attention the proposals made by the Secretary-General in his position paper.

Furthermore, we believe that more attention should be focused on certain measures of preventive diplomacy, such as fact-finding missions, preventive deployment and early-warning capabilities.

We share the observations of the Secretary-General in the Supplement with regard to the qualitative and quantitative changes that have been taking place since the end of the cold war — in particular, on the tragic human toll of the increased hostilities that have surfaced. The sheer number of the refugees — given by the Secretary-General as 26 million, representing a two-fold increase since 1987 — calls for swift and determined action. We believe that as one immediate step the financial and material capabilities of the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) should be enhanced.

In the area of disarmament, the Secretary-General introduces two new concepts in his position paper — namely, micro-disarmament and macro-disarmament. The proposition that micro-disarmament is relevant to post-conflict peace-building is particularly interesting and worth considering. We also agree with the Secretary-General's assessment that

> "The ... significance of micro-disarmament is demonstrated by the enormous proliferation of automatic assault weapons, anti-personnel mines and the like." *(S/1995/1, para. 61)*

We believe that the efforts to address the proliferation of this type of armament should be carefully balanced between the need to deal with its serious consequences and the legitimate rights of States to defend themselves. Accordingly, the relevant measures in this area should focus on ways to enable the various arms control mechanisms to detect and verify illegal end-users.

We fully endorse the Secretary-General's views pertaining to sanctions — particularly his reference to Article 50 of the Charter. As he rightly states in paragraph 73 of his supplementary report,

> "Sanctions are a measure taken collectively by the United Nations to maintain or restore international peace and security. The costs involved in their application, like other such costs ... should be borne equitably by all Member States and not exclusively by the few who have the misfortune to be neighbours or major economic partners of the target country." *(S/1995/1, para. 73)*

We wholeheartedly support the Secretary-General's proposals, contained in paragraph 75 of his position paper, regarding the establishment of a mechanism to carry out certain functions in relation to sanctions.

To the observations made by the Secretary-General I must add that the lack of efficient consultation mechanisms and secrecy in the decision-making of the Council are also causing great concern to the general membership. In this context, I should like to reiterate what I said to this body on 16 December last year, especially in reference to the imposition and review of the economic sanctions. Since all Member States must comply with sanctions imposed by the United Nations, we propose that the decision-making and the review process thereon must be totally transparent.

To be effective, sanctions regimes require the full cooperation of the Member States. The successful implementation of sanctions can be ensured only with great sacrifice by the countries most affected. It is difficult to understand why reviews of existing sanction regimes are held in closed, informal consultations. At this point I should like to repeat our concrete proposal. We request that the Council consider

> "reviewing existing sanction regimes in public meetings with open debate." *(S/PV.3483, p.18)*

In this vein, it is the considered opinion of my country that the sanction committees should also carry out their deliberations in public meetings or inform the non-member countries of their deliberations and decisions by circulating detailed reports periodically. We strongly believe that openness in the activities of the Council with respect to sanctions would make the system more just and fair.

We took note with particular attention of the Secretary General's remarks and suggestions in his supplementary report with respect to the peace-keeping activities of the United Nations, and urge members to carefully examine their implications.

We hold the view that the success of peace-keeping operations rests on a clear and practicable mandate given by the Security Council, the cooperation of the parties concerned, the readiness of Member States to contribute personnel and, last but not least, adequate financial and logistic support.

Furthermore, mandates must be tailored to the realities and imperatives of the situation. In conjunction with this, mandates of peace-keeping operations should be periodically reviewed, and, when necessary, mandates which no longer correspond to the prevailing situation should be modified, so that peace-keeping forces could operate with maximum efficiency. In this respect, their degree of effectiveness should also be reviewed and, if appropriate, they should be streamlined in keeping with the goal of minimizing the costs.

In view of the financial strains that we face with regard to the peace-keeping activities, I would like to refer once again to the proposals made by the Secretary General in "An Agenda for Peace." We continue to support his proposals contained therein to deal with this problem, such as taxing arms sales, retaining budgetary surpluses, increasing the Working Capital Fund, authorizing commercial borrowing and establishing a peace endowment fund.

Given the stark realities that we painfully witness around the globe, especially in the humanitarian aspects of the conflicts, the Secretary-General's conclusion in his supplementary report on the need to give serious thought to the idea of a rapid deployment force is thought-provoking and merits urgent consideration. Such a force could also play a deterrent role in certain cases, depending on its size, mandate, modalities of deployment, level of readiness and proximity to potential conflict areas.

It is our firm opinion that the regional organizations have much to contribute to the maintenance of peace and security within the framework of Chapter VIII of the Charter. The challenges we are facing today are far greater than the means and resources of the United Nations to respond to them by itself effectively and adequately. We believe that the activities of the United Nations and the regional organizations should be viewed as mutually reinforcing and complementary in nature. In this respect, we should also bear in mind that the United Nations continues to play the central role in the maintenance of peace and security around the world. To this effect, we add our voice to the Secretary-General's point that, given the unique characteristics of each situation and the varied mandates, as well as the structures of the regional organizations, an attempt to establish a universal model for their relationship with the United Nations would be counterproductive. In this context, we support the principles that are laid out by the Secretary-General in paragraph 88 of his report as the basis of this relationship.

This year we are celebrating the fiftieth anniversary of this Organization. It is a most opportune time to take stock of our past experiences and start reflecting on the future. I sincerely hope that the Secretary-General's supplementary report to "An Agenda For Peace" will be an appropriate starting point to this end.

The President (*interpretation from Spanish*): The next speaker is the representative of Canada. I invite him to take a place at the Council table and to make his statement.

Mr. Fowler (Canada): I would first wish to congratulate you, Sir, on your accession to the Security Council presidency for the month of January. The Council has already done a substantial amount of work under your capable leadership. I also wish to congratulate your predecessor, the Permanent Representative of Rwanda, for the diligence with which he discharged his duties during the month of December.

This being my first appearance before the Security Council in almost 20 years, I would like to assure the Council of my delegation's full cooperation in the pursuit of our common objectives.

Mr. President, with your indulgence, allow me to join my colleagues and, for my part, express the sympathy of Canadians for the horrible tragedy which has befallen the people of Kobe in Japan.

Canada warmly welcomes the Secretary-General's presentation of the supplement to his Agenda for Peace. He is doing so at an opportune moment in this, the fiftieth year in the life of our Organization; it is indeed time to take stock of the major questions facing the United Nations. These have been clearly spelled out by the Secretary-General in the Supplement and in his Agenda for Development. We all recognize that the questions raised in the Agenda for Peace and the Agenda for Development are inextricably connected.

I am pleased to have this opportunity to express before the Council a few preliminary views on the

Secretary-General's paper, a document which Canada is, of course, examining very closely.

We agree in large part with the Secretary-General's accurate and eloquent analysis of the quantitative and qualitative changes in the activities of the Organization in the field of international peace and security. It is true that in just a short period of time our collective burden has become much heavier.

We also endorse the main features of his findings and recommendations concerning the instruments we must acquire in order to deal more effectively with the numerous ethnic, racial, religious and other conflicts which face our world and which threaten to multiply in the coming years.

Spoke in French

Of course, it is important to improve the range of instruments at our disposal to enable the United Nations to fulfil its role. But it is of prime importance that we, the Member States, decide collectively on the role we are prepared to play in the face of the bloody conflicts breaking out all over the world, and on what our Organization's role should be. These are, without question, hard decisions.

What kind of a commitment are we, the Member States, prepared to make to prevent the repetition of tragedies such as Rwanda? We have been unable, collectively, to provide an adequate response to this genocide. Under what circumstances are we, the Member States, prepared to lay the lives of our soldiers on the line to try to prevent massacres of innocent people?

Obviously there is no easy or immediate answer to these questions. Past experience has also shown that no two situations are alike. In some cases, for example, it may be preferable, despite our sense of urgency, to refrain from intervening immediately in a conflict by way of a peace-keeping operation. It may be more effective to try by other means to help the parties concerned find long-term solutions to their problems. In other instances a rapid, significant intervention may be the best approach.

In any case, we can reaffirm our determination not to remain insensitive to the misery caused by armed conflict, and reiterate our commitment to try, to the best of our ability, to find collective solutions more effective than those used recently.

In the face of the difficulties encountered in various recent operations, some will feel that the Security Council should no longer intervene in complex intra-State conflicts. For its part, Canada encourages the Security Council to continue to be concerned in solving both intra-State and inter-State conflicts. As pointed out by the Secretary-General, intra-State conflicts are today the most frequent and the most violent.

Others may feel that the United Nations should take refuge in traditional peace-keeping operations. We cannot share this kind of approach, which would limit the international community's intervention to increasingly less frequent situations. In fact, I would even add that engaging in the "classical" type of operation is no guarantee of success at the political level.

We have made some remarkable efforts in the field of peace-keeping over the past few years and spent considerable resources on numerous new types of operations. We have lost a number of soldiers. We have tried to respond to new world-wide challenges. But the difficulties we have encountered, particularly in Somalia, Bosnia, Croatia and Rwanda, have demonstrated that good intentions alone cannot obtain the desired results. We must respond to each new situation in an appropriate way and give the Organization the means it requires to fulfil its objectives.

I do not claim that I shall analyse the Secretary General's report in detail today. We shall do so at some later time and in the context of the General Assembly. However, I should like to highlight now certain parts of the Supplement which we feel are particularly important.

The activities of preventive diplomacy and peacemaking are crucial; there is no longer any need to demonstrate that they are necessary. As the Secretary-General indicates, there is no lack of information on potential conflicts, and it is rather the reluctance of one or other of the parties to accept United Nations preventive help that limits our capacity for action. In order better to use the information at our disposal, we feel that the Economic and Social Council should assist the Security Council, the General Assembly and the Secretary-General better to anticipate problems and develop strategies to address the economic and social causes of conflicts. As others have done, we have supplied the Secretary-General with a list of eminent personalities who might represent him in preventive diplomacy activities.

As for peace-keeping operations, we must again stress the need for clear, achievable mandates from the Security Council, and the need to find practical ways to institutionalize the Security Council's consultations with troop-contributing nations. We must also ensure that the roles of the Security Council, the Secretary-General and regional organizations involved in the implementation of peace-keeping operations are clearly defined and respected. It is worth recalling that, in the final analysis, the Security Council will always be accountable for the results of such operations. The same can be said of the Secretary-General's accountability for the execution of missions.

We have, moreover, come to realize that, as the Secretary-General points out, it is always dangerous to transform an ongoing peace-keeping operation which depends on the consent of the parties into an operation requiring the use of force. And we, the Member States, must supply the Secretary-General with the necessary troops, adequately equipped and trained to carry out their assigned mandate. We must also give these operations a sound basis and therefore meet on time our financial obligations in this respect.

Concerning the Secretary-General's idea for a rapid response force, Canada, as is known, has launched an extensive study on practical short-, medium- and long-term options to improve the rapid reaction capability of the United Nations in times of crisis. The results of this study will be available at the next session of the Assembly. To this end, we have sought the assistance of numerous international experts and are counting on the active cooperation of the Secretariat.

We share the Secretary-General's views on disarmament and the importance of the Conference of parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, which we hope will be renewed for an indefinite period. The same applies to the urgent need for the Convention on chemical weapons to enter into force. The control of conventional weapons also remains a priority area of intervention, and we are convinced that better use should be made of the Register of Conventional Arms, for example where anti-personnel mines are concerned.

We must admit that to date our experience with sanctions has produced mixed results. They are an imperfect but essential instrument and are among the various mechanisms available to influence the behaviour of Governments that defy the international community. The considerable efforts made by a number of States to lift even partially the sanctions imposed on them show how effective they are. Even if we could see the advantages of a prior assessment of the impact of sanctions, we do not feel that we should establish mechanisms that might unduly delay their imposition.

We share the Secretary-General's comments on the need to coordinate effectively international action in the area of peace and security. We endorse his concept of the role that regional organizations should play and the parameters that should guide relations between the United Nations and the latter. We also believe, like the Secretary-General, in the usefulness of establishing groups of "friends of the Secretary-General" to assist him in meeting his objectives. Such small, well-balanced groups of interested States have proved their usefulness by having their members become more deeply involved in the resolution of conflicts.

Let us hope that this fiftieth anniversary year will be not only, as it should be, a year a celebration but also a year of reflection for our Organization. In the coming months the questions raised by the Secretary-General will be the subject of discussions not only among States, in which Canada will participate actively, but among the general public as well. Let us all encourage a broad, open debate that will help us set the course for future years.

The President (*interpretation from Spanish*): I thank the representative of Canada for the kind words he addressed to me.

The next speaker is the representative of Japan. I invite him to take a place at the Council table and to make his statement.

Mr. Maruyama (Japan): On behalf of my Government, I should like to express my deepest appreciation for the expressions of sympathy and condolence offered by you, Mr. President, the Council members and other Member States to the people and Government of Japan in connection with the recent earthquake. I shall certainly convey those messages to my Government.

At the outset, let me congratulate you, Sir, on your assumption of the presidency of the Security Council for the month of January. I am sure that under your able guidance the Council will conduct its work most effectively. Our thanks go also to Ambassador

Bakuramutsa of Rwanda for the skilful manner in which he guided the work of the Council last December.

The "Supplement to An Agenda for Peace: Position Paper of the Secretary-General" offers new suggestions for enhancing United Nations peace-keeping and peacemaking functions in the light of recent changes in the international situation and the successes and failures of recent peace-keeping efforts. It highlights certain areas where unforeseen difficulties have arisen since June 1992, when the Secretary-General's "An Agenda for Peace" was issued. Japan appreciates the generally more realistic approach it takes to the issue of peace and security, building on past lessons and experiences. That this paper was presented to us as we prepare for the fiftieth anniversary of the United Nations makes it quite timely, and we look forward to participating in the active discussions that it will surely stimulate.

Permit me to offer Japan's comments on major points contained in the "Supplement to An Agenda for Peace".

The Secretary-General indicates that, in addition to a dramatic quantitative increase in United Nations activities relating to the maintenance of peace and security, there have been qualitative changes that are of even greater significance. As the paper points out, so many of today's conflicts occur within the boundaries of a State rather than between States. The collapse of State institutions is a common feature of such conflicts. The use of United Nations forces to protect humanitarian operations is another growing trend. Japan agrees with the Secretary-General in his analysis and the importance he attaches to this trend. Indeed, such qualitative changes must be taken into account in the effort to devise more appropriate means of enhancing international peace and security.

Among United Nations activities, those relating to preventive diplomacy and peacemaking deserve to be given greater priority. I note that an effort has been made to find persons with the requisite diplomatic skills and experience to serve as mediators, special representatives or special envoys of the Secretary-General. That effort should be reinforced, for example, through the preparation of a list of the persons so identified. In cases where such persons lack sufficient experience and understanding with respect to the United Nations, it is important that training be provided for them in order to ensure that they discharge their tasks as effectively as possible.

We share with the Secretary-General the recognition of the need to establish and dispatch small field missions to engage in preventive diplomacy and peacemaking efforts in a timely manner and for a sufficient period of time. In an effort to conserve budgetary resources, cooperation with regional organizations and the use of their skilled personnel should be pursued and encouraged.

Japan is of the view that in cases where coercive action is necessary, the mandate must clearly define the action as exceptional and specify its duration, since a coercive peace-keeping operation is likely to result in the United Nations becoming a party to the conflict and thus deviate from the principle of impartiality. We note with appreciation that the Secretary-General takes a cautious approach to peace enforcement.

As recent experience has demonstrated, adherence to the traditional principles of peace-keeping — particularly the consent of the conflicting parties, impartiality, the non-use of force except in self-defence, and the commitment by the parties to a cease-fire and peace agreement — is essential to the success of any peace-keeping operation. Japan is pleased to note the similar analysis offered by the Secretary-General. At the same time, comprehensive peace-keeping operations such as the United Nations Transitional Authority in Cambodia (UNTAC) are relevant to today's world and will remain a valid and effective approach. Furthermore, in order for a peacekeeping operation to be truly successful it is essential that it be integrated into an overall political process from the beginning.

Whenever the Council decides to establish a new peace-keeping operation, it is imperative that its mandate be defined in detail and its time-frame clearly stipulated in a so-called sunset clause. It is unacceptable and financially irresponsible to prolong a peace-keeping operation while its specific goals and timetable remain vague.

Once a decision has been made to establish a peace-keeping operation, it is essential that it be deployed in a timely manner. Towards this end, possible personnel- and equipment-contributors could be identified even before the Council took a final decision. It is also crucial that the personnel deployed be provided with the necessary training. In particular, in the light of the increasing role of the civilian component in recent peace-keeping efforts, unified training programmes and manuals for use by civilian personnel, such as civilian police, as well as by military personnel are urgently required.

With respect to the Secretary-General's idea of a "rapid reaction force" Japan joins others in stressing the importance of developing a level of preparedness for the timely deployment of peace-keeping operations, and commends the Secretary-General's initiative. On the other hand, further clarification of the following points is required: If it is expected that the force may be dispatched to any region of conflict solely by a decision of the Council, will there be any Member State willing to provide troops for such a force? Does the anticipated effectiveness of this force override considerations of the cost involved?

Clarification will also be needed as to how to avoid the facile and unrestrained dispatch and deployment of peace-keeping operations as a result of the materialization of this idea. Concerning the concept of "a reserve stock of standard peace-keeping equipment", it may be necessary to give further thought as to the ability of each national contingent to make full use of unfamiliar equipment, and as to the maintenance of such equipment.

As described in the Secretary-General's paper, as the peace-keeping stage of a United Nations effort comes to an end it is important to arrange for the smooth transfer of responsibility from the Council to the General Assembly or to a small support group chaired by the Secretary-General to promote peace-building. This will require greater coordination between the two bodies. But it is also useful to start discussing post-conflict peace-building and reconstruction even before a conflict is settled, as this could serve as an incentive for the parties to expedite an early conclusion of the conflict. In Cambodia, for instance, Japan took the initiative of calling for the convening of a reconstruction conference before there was a cessation of hostilities. This was a part of our efforts toward post-conflict peacebuilding there, and contributed to the eventual settlement of the conflict.

The Secretary-General does not discuss in detail the issue of, in his words, "macro disarmament". My delegation would like to stress, however, that 1995 is important as the year in which the Conference on the review and extension of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) will be held. Let me simply reiterate here that Japan supports the unlimited extension of the NPT in order to enhance the stability of the nuclear non-proliferation regime. Similarly, it is also important to promote nuclear disarmament, and Japan hopes that further efforts in this regard will be made by the nuclear-weapon States.

At the same time, the importance of an early conclusion of the negotiations on a comprehensive test-ban treaty cannot be overemphasized. With respect to what the Secretary-General calls "micro-disarmament," as Foreign Minister Kono stressed in his statement at the forty-ninth session of the General Assembly the easy transfer of conventional arms and their excessive accumulation are a destabilizing factor in various regions of the world. It is therefore an issue that demands the serious attention of the international community. Moreover, my delegation wishes to associate itself with the Secretary-General in emphasizing the importance of regulating anti-personnel mines and of strengthening the Register of Conventional Arms, as well as of promoting regional disarmament.

In his paper, the Secretary-General addresses the complicated issue of sanctions, and suggests that a mechanism be established to improve their effectiveness and reduce unintended collateral damage. This is certainly a controversial and sensitive issue. While noting the points made in the paper, we must not forget that sanctions are one of the few effective instruments at our disposal that can be used to convey the will and determination of the international community without resorting to the ultimate instrument, the use of force. It is also important to keep in mind that the purpose of sanctions is to modify the policy and behaviour of a party that is threatening international peace and security, and that the use of sanctions is clearly defined by the Charter of the United Nations.

Having said this, I acknowledge that it may be increasingly necessary to take into account the question of the impact sanctions can have on the economies of neighbouring countries in extending bilateral and multilateral cooperation to those countries. Japan, for its part, is ready to consider the impact of sanctions as it formulates its aid policy. It is desirable that appropriate humanitarian assistance activities are guaranteed even in the target country. We would suggest that there may be room for improvement in the actual practice of the sanctions committees and humanitarian agencies in more accurately assessing humanitarian needs and removing various factors impeding the activities of the humanitarian agencies in the target country.

Japan shares the view of the Secretary-General that improved coordination with the United Nations system as a whole is necessary.

In closing, my delegation wishes to stress that in order to enhance the peace-keeping and peacemaking functions of the United Nations in line with some of the suggestions made by the Secretary-General, it is essential that each Member State pay its assessed contributions in full and on time. At the same time, we would urge the Secretariat to strive to conduct its work more efficiently. While we understand that new initiatives require a certain amount of financial backing, we would encourage both the Council and the Secretariat, with the cooperation of Member States, to be brave enough to cut financial allocations where appropriate and necessary. We should not even shy away from the difficult decision of bringing to an end any United Nations activity that has largely achieved its original objective.

The United Nations is faced with ever-increasing challenges and expectations; its capacity and resources, however, remain limited. This requires that we embark upon a serious discussion as to how to establish priorities among the many important issues which the United Nations is called upon to address.

The President (*interpretation from Spanish*): I thank the representative of Japan for the kind words he addressed to me.

There are still 15 names on the list of speakers. In view of the lateness of the hour and with the concurrence of the members of the Council, I will suspend this meeting now.

The Council will continue consideration of this item tomorrow, Thursday, 19 January, at 10 a.m.

The meeting was suspended at 7.15 p.m.